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IN THE NAME OF THE CHILD: RACE, GENDER, AND 
ECONOMICS IN ADOPTIVE COUPLE V. BABY GIRL 
Bethany R. Berger* 
Abstract 
On June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court decided Adoptive Couple v. Baby 
Girl, holding that the Indian Child Welfare Act did not permit the 
Cherokee father in that case to object to termination of his parental rights. 
The case was ostensibly about a dispute between prospective adoptive 
parents and a biological father. But this Article demonstrates that it was 
about a lot more than that. It was a microcosm of anxieties about Indian-
ness, race, and the changing nature of parenthood. While made in the name 
of the child, moreover, the decision supports practices and policies that do 
not forward and may even undermine children’s interests. 
Drawing on published and unpublished court records and testimony, 
this Article reveals that the Court’s portrayal of the facts of the case was 
wrong. Instead of a deadbeat dad acting as a spoiler in the adoption of the 
daughter he had abandoned, the birth father sought to parent his daughter 
from the moment he learned his fiancée was pregnant. He was initially 
prevented from learning of the adoption plan by the actions of the other 
parties and their attorneys. The decision distorted the law as well, doing 
violence to long-accepted interpretations of the statute at issue. Why did 
the Court mischaracterize the facts and the law? This Article examines the 
narratives of the interests of the child, racial color-blindness, and even 
women’s rights that surrounded the case to reveal that the decision in fact 
rested on racialization and colonialism of Indian people, condemnation of 
poor single mothers, economic interests of private adoption facilitators, 
and the class divides in modern paths to parenthood. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This story starts with a little girl—known legally as Baby Girl, as Baby 
Veronica in the media frenzy that surrounded her case, as Ronnie Brown to 
her biological father and his family, and as Veronica Capobianco to the 
couple that ultimately adopted her—who was removed when she was two 
years old from the couple that wanted to adopt her and placed with her 
biological father, then removed from him when she was four years old to 
go back to the adoptive couple. Although the second removal—unlike the 
first—occurred without a hearing as to her best interests, it was made 
primarily in the name of that many-named child. This Article investigates 
the case to argue that it in fact reflected concerns founded in race, gender, 
and economics that have little to do with children’s interests.  
At birth, Veronica was placed by her mother, Christinna Maldonado, 
with Melanie Duncan1 and Matthew Capobianco (the Capobiancos). 
Although Maldonado had begun negotiating with the Capobiancos months 
before, it was not until Veronica was almost four months old that anyone 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Although usually referred to as Melanie Capobianco by the media, Melanie’s professional 
name, and the name by which her attorneys referred to her in a recent pleading, is Melanie Duncan. 
Compare Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and Brief in Support, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 
No. FA-2013-4 (Dist. Ct. Notawa Cnty. Okla. Nov. 1, 2013) (referring to the adoptive mother as 
Melanie Duncan), with Ariane de Vogue, “Baby Veronica” Custody Case Rages On, ABC NEWS 
(Sept. 11, 2013, 2:12 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/09/baby-veronica-custody-
case-rages-on/ (referring to the adoptive mother as Melanie Capobianco). 
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informed her father, Dusten Brown, of the placement and planned 
adoption. Brown immediately objected and sought custody. The South 
Carolina courts found that Brown was a fit and loving father whose 
parental rights could not be terminated under the Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA), and ordered Veronica placed in his custody.2 
Eighteen months later, however, in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,3 the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that Brown had no right to object to the adoption 
under ICWA.4 In July 2013, without a factual hearing, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court ordered that Veronica be taken from her father and his wife 
for the adoption to be finalized.5 In August 2013, Brown turned himself in 
for criminal custodial interference rather than relinquish her, but the 
Oklahoma courts issued an emergency stay, and the Governor of Oklahoma 
initially declined to extradite him. Finally, on September 23, 2013, shortly 
after her fourth birthday, the Browns reluctantly released Veronica to the 
Capobiancos.6  
From many perspectives—including those of parents of any kind, of 
prospective adoptive parents, and of Native communities scarred by 
generations of lost children—this is a heartbreaking story. This Article is 
not another effort to capture that heartbreak. The media has extensively 
covered it—or versions of it—including on an episode of Dr. Phil.7 This 
Article instead examines the lenses of race, gender, and economics through 
which the story has been filtered and understood, and their influence on the 
opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court. It argues that in the name of the 
nameless Baby Girl and her interests, the Court participated in a long-
standing trend of using children to forward racial, gender, and economic 
agendas that violate the rights of their birth parents and, ultimately, the 
interests of the children themselves. 
Most striking in this case was the role of race. Before the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the attorneys for the Capobiancos and the Guardian ad Litem (star 
Supreme Court litigators Lisa Blatt and Paul Clement)8 argued that ICWA 
was unconstitutional, race-based legislation.9 The majority opinion rested 
on statutory rather than constitutional arguments, only briefly noting that 
its interpretation avoided unspecified “equal protection concerns,”10 but 
                                                                                                                     
 2. See infra Section I.A. 
 3. 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). 
 4. Id. at 2557. 
 5. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 346, 347 (S.C. 2013), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 
2552. 
 6. See infra Section I.A. 
 7. Adoption Controversy: Battle over Baby Veronica, DR. PHIL (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.drphil.com/shows/show/1895/. 
 8. See infra Section I.B. 
 9. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2570 n.3. 
 10. See id. at 2565. 
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these arguments clearly influenced the judgment. In the first line of the 
decision, the Court stated that “[t]his case is about a little girl (Baby Girl) 
who is classified as an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee.”11 As 
discussed below, the statement was untrue on several levels and irrelevant 
to the legal issues in the case, but it was consistent with an effort that has 
existed since colonial times to erase Native peoples and their sovereignty 
by facilitating the assimilation and absorption of Native individuals. In 
Adoptive Couple, however, this longstanding campaign was repackaged in 
the service of color-blindness. This Article examines this paradox as well 
as its conflict with constitutional law, which has consistently, if not always 
coherently, found that federal recognition of descent-based tribal identity 
does not violate the constitution.  
Gender played an important role in the case as well. The case facially 
pitted the rights of birth mothers against those of birth fathers. The media, 
moreover, sought to portray Brown as a deadbeat dad standing in the way 
of Maldonado’s efforts to find a better home for her child. Unpacking this 
narrative, however, reveals trends far more threatening to both women and 
their children. The current policies favoring adoption and reducing birth 
parent rights emerged from the backlash against poor single mothers in the 
1980s and 1990s and the proffering of adoption as a solution to both 
illegitimacy and the increasing numbers of children in foster care.12 As a 
result, most states have sharply limited the rights of both birth fathers and 
birth mothers in adoptions.13 Before Adoptive Couple, ICWA cases were 
among the few adoptions not subject to this trend.14 
Although proponents justify these policy shifts with children’s interests, 
the justification rests on false premises. First, the demand for infants 
relinquished at birth is so high that it is unaffected by ensuring meaningful 
consent by birth parents before adoption.15 Second, the adoption industry 
has little demand for children in the foster care population, who are mostly 
not newborns, some of whose development has been affected by 
mistreatment, and who are more likely to be African American—a group 
facing significant discrimination in private adoptions.16 Despite a decades-
long policy shift as well as billions of dollars spent on adoption subsidies 
and adoption promotion, only one in five children exiting foster care leaves 
through adoption. Of those that do, almost all are adopted by foster parents 
and a significant fraction by extended-family foster parents.17 The 
                                                                                                                     
 11. Id. at 2556. 
 12. See infra Section IV.B. 
 13. See infra Section IV.B. 
 14. See infra Section V.B. 
 15. See infra notes 174–94 and accompanying text.  
 16. See infra notes 189–90, 197–98 and accompanying text. 
 17. Infra notes 396–98 and accompanying text. 
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determination that Brown had no right to consent, in other words, was 
connected to policies that denigrate poor single mothers, diminish the 
ability of both mothers and fathers to contest adoption, and reduce 
financial and parenting support to poor families—all without meaningfully 
affecting rates of adoption. Their net effect has been to harm both mothers 
and children, particularly those of color.  
The economic divides resulting from the impact of these policies are 
also significant. First, class divides the two paths to parenthood presented 
in the case and shapes the value attached to each path. The situation of the 
Capobiancos—married, highly educated, seeking adoption after years of 
unsuccessful treatment for infertility—is familiar and sympathetic to 
upper-middle-class judges and lawyers. (Chief Justice John Roberts, for 
example, is an adoptive father himself.)18 The situation of Dusten Brown—
unplanned father of a child whose mother did not want to marry him—is 
perhaps more common but less familiar to upper-middle-class decision 
makers,19 and certainly less valorized in popular media. Are the 
Capobiancos baby buyers or are they the family any right-thinking 
biological father would want for his child? Is Brown a deadbeat dad or a 
thwarted father just trying to make the best of a bad situation? Class may 
be as important as race or gender in determining the answers to these 
questions.  
Perhaps more important than class are the economic interests of those 
facilitating private adoptions. Outside of foster care and adoptions by 
relatives, adoptions are largely conducted through private agencies, 
attorneys, and facilitators. These entities charge large fees for their 
services—in 2009, the average cost to adopt an infant was $32,000,20 and 
highs around $100,000 have long been possible.21 These private interests 
depend on a supply of adoptable babies—an increasingly rare commodity 
in the United States—and on completed adoptions. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that both the American Academy of Adoption Attorneys and the 
National Council for Adoption, which represents private adoption 
agencies,22 filed amicus briefs on behalf of the Capobiancos.23  
                                                                                                                     
 18. Infra note 471 and accompanying text. 
 19. See generally JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS 
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 3–5, 8 (2014) (discussing class-based choices regarding whether 
to marry). 
 20. Mariagiovanna Baccara, Allan Collard-Wexler, Leonardo Felli & Leeat Yariv, Gender 
and Racial Biases: Evidence from Child Adoption 2 (CESifo Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
2921, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1545711. 
 21. Laura Mansnerus, Market Puts Price Tag on the Priceless, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/26/us/market-puts-price-tags-on-the-priceless.html. 
 22. NAT’L COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION, FY2013 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2013), available at 
http://www.adoptioncouncil.org/files/large/109d5e2bf763e83 (describing membership as largely 
adoption agencies, but including some adoption attorneys and “advocates”). 
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Finally, states may have economic interests in having children adopted 
by upper-middle-class families rather than remaining with low income 
ones. Because payments from the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families program follow the child,24 removing children from a poor family 
greatly reduces the state’s obligation to provide such aid. Perhaps 
recognizing the limited impact of adoption laws on rates of adoption or 
welfare dependency, however, states did not intervene on behalf of the 
Capobiancos. Instead, eighteen states submitted an amicus brief agreeing 
that according full rights to birth fathers under ICWA was in the interests 
of children and promoted just and stable adoptions.25  
This Article explores the role that race, gender, and economics played 
in Adoptive Couple and its popular reception. Part I outlines the facts and 
law of the decision. Part II challenges the idea that the result in this case 
served the best interests of children, relying on the facts of the case, 
statistics regarding adoption and foster care, as well as the amicus briefs of 
eighteen child welfare organizations and another eighteen states who 
argued that the lower court’s ruling furthered the best interests of children. 
Part III discusses the role of race and the ways that assertions of racial 
egalitarianism were used to replicate racial colonialism of Indian peoples. 
Part IV discusses the role of gender, flipping the assertions of the rights of 
birth mothers to show the connections between undermining Dusten 
Brown’s rights and undermining the rights of poor mothers generally. Part 
V discusses the role of economics, including both the class divides 
between adoptive parents and birth parents, and the economic interests of 
those who facilitate adoptions and states charged with supporting poor 
families.  
I.  FIXING THE FACTS, EXPLAINING THE LAW 
This Part first attempts to correct the distortions of fact leading to the 
decision in Adoptive Couple. It then describes the battle between legal 
superstars in the U.S. Supreme Court and the legal flaws in the resulting 
decision. 
                                                                                                                     
 23. Brief for Am. Acad. of Adoption Attorneys as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12–399); Brief for Nat’l Council for 
Adoption as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12–399). 
 24. Office of Child Welfare, Dep’t of Children & Families, Maintenance Adoption Subsidy, 
CTR. FOR CHILD WELFARE 6 (Mar. 2012), http://centerforchildwelfare.fmhi.usf.edu/kb/RevMax/
AdoptionSubsidyPresentationMar2012.pdf. 
 25. Brief of the States of Arizona, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, 
Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Washington, and Wisconsin as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents Birth Father and the 
Cherokee Nation at 16, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12–399) [hereinafter Brief of the 
States]. 
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A.  Facts 
Most of the facts in Adoptive Couple are undisputed, but they have been 
frequently misrepresented. This Section therefore presents the facts of the 
case at some length, trying to the greatest extent possible to rely on those 
facts presented in judicial opinions and sworn testimony credited by the 
trial court.  
Dusten Brown and Christinna Maldonado had dated on and off since 
high school, but the off periods were long enough that Brown married, had 
a child with, and divorced another woman, while Maldonado had two 
children of her own with another man.26 They began dating again, 
however, and in December 2008, Brown and Maldonado got engaged.27 At 
that time, Brown—a soldier who received a Bronze Star for his service in 
Iraq—lived at the Army Base in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, about four hours 
away from Bartlesville and nearby Notawa, Oklahoma, where Brown grew 
up and where his family and Maldonado both lived.28 In January 2009, 
Maldonado told Brown she was pregnant; he responded by asking her to 
move up their planned wedding.29 The family court found that Brown was 
excited to learn of the pregnancy and “[i]nstead of shirking his 
responsibilities, he implored [her] to move the wedding date forward” and 
move into base housing with her two children so that she and the child 
could “avail [themselves] of the benefits [they] were entitled to as military 
dependents.”30  
Maldonado refused, stopped taking Brown’s calls, and in May 2009, 
broke off their relationship by text message.31 In June, she sent him another 
text asking whether he would rather pay child support or relinquish his 
parental rights; he responded that he would rather relinquish his rights.32 
He later testified that he hoped that this would cause her to rethink the 
decision not to marry him.33 The family court found that Brown only 
intended to agree to Maldonado’s sole custody, and did not find credible 
Maldonado’s testimony that Brown was trying to avoid paying child 
support.34 Maldonado testified that Brown did not contact her after she 
                                                                                                                     
 26. See Testimony of Dusten Brown—Direct Examination by Ms. Jones at 477–78, Adoptive 
Couple v. Baby Girl, 2009-DR-10-3803 (S.C. Fam. Ct. Sept. 14, 2011). 
 27. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 552 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 
2552. 
 28. Id. at 553 & n.2. 
 29. Id. at 552–53. 
 30. Transcript of Record at 13, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, No. 2009-DR-10-03803 (S.C. 
Fam. Ct. Sept. 29, 2011); see also Brief in Opposition, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-
399), 2012 WL 5994979, at *4–5 (citation omitted). 
 31. See Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 553. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 15. 
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texted him in June.35 Yet Brown testified that Maldonado did not respond 
to multiple text messages or open the door when he drove to Bartlesville to 
see her.36 Further, Brown’s mother testified that she called to offer 
Maldonado money and hand-knitted baby things—twenty-four beaded 
baby socks—but Maldonado did not reply.37 The family court found that 
Brown “attempted to contact her on numerous occasions during her 
pregnancy, and she denied his attempts,” and that Brown’s family had 
“attempted to provide [the] birth mother with essentials for the minor 
child, but she refused their efforts as well.”38  
Financially struggling,39 Maldonado sought to place the baby for 
adoption.40 Through a maze of adoption service providers, Maldonado was 
connected with the Capobiancos of James Island, South Carolina.41 The 
Capobiancos had been through seven unsuccessful rounds of in vitro 
fertilization and were seeking to adopt.42 Melanie Duncan Capobianco has 
a Ph.D. in developmental psychology and works at home, consulting on 
children’s therapies, while Matthew Capobianco is an automotive 
technician with Boeing.43 During Maldonado’s pregnancy, the 
Capobiancos paid her “rent, car payments, and utilities,”44 and allegedly 
gave Maldonado about $10,000 in financial assistance, not including her 
medical fees, which were covered by the state.45  
The notes from Maldonado’s preplacement interview with the 
Nightlight Christian Adoption Agency report that “[i]nitially the birth 
                                                                                                                     
 35. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 569. 
 36. Suzette Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 2: The Devil’s in the Details, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (May 13, 2013) [hereinafter Brewer, The Fight for Baby 
Veronica, Part 2], http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/05/13/fight-baby-veronica-
part-2-149336. 
 37. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555 n.9; Testimony of Alice Brown―Direct Examination 
by Ms. Jones at 564, 2009-DR-10-3803 (S.C. Fam. Ct. Sept. 14, 2011); Brewer, The Fight for Baby 
Veronica, Part 2, supra note 36. 
 38. Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 13–14. 
 39. One (admittedly slanted) news report indicated that she was also paying child support for 
her two other children. Suzette Brewer, Some Disturbing Facts About Baby Veronica’s Birth 
Mother, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Aug. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Brewer, Some 
Disturbing Facts], http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/08/12/selling-christy-
maldonado-150831 (discussing court records of child custody and child support disputes showing 
that the court ordered Maldonado to pay $252 a month in child support to the father of her other 
children—children who are being raised by their paternal grandmother). 
 40. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 570. 
 41. See infra notes 439–43 and accompanying text. 
 42. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 570. 
 43. See id. at 553, 579. 
 44. Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 14. 
 45. See Suzette Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 1, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY 
MEDIA NETWORK (May 6, 2013) [hereinafter Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 1], 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/05/06/fight-baby-veronica-part-1-149219. 
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mother did not wish to identify the father, said she wanted to keep things 
low-key as possible for the [Appellants], because he’s registered in the 
Cherokee tribe. It was determined that naming him would be detrimental to 
the adoption.”46 On August 21, 2009, the attorney the Capobiancos hired to 
represent Maldonado’s interests wrote to the Cherokee Nation of 
Oklahoma: 
 My office is working with a South Carolina attorney in the 
interstate placement of a baby to be born sometime in mid-
September. The baby’s mother believes she is part-Cherokee, 
and the baby’s father is supposedly enrolled with the 
Cherokee Nation. 
. . . The birth father is: Dustin [sic] Dale Brown 
(1/8 Cherokee, supposedly enrolled) 
DOB:XX, XX, 1983[sic] 
Born and raised in Oklahoma,  
Presently in the army at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma 
 . . . the birth mother chose [the Capobiancos] to adopt her 
baby and has been working with them for the past four to five 
months . . . and she believes the father has no objection . . . 
Could you let me know whether you would object to this 
adoption by a non-Indian family—and whether the birth 
mother, Christy, is eligible for a CDIB Card?47  
The letter misspelled Brown’s name as “Dustin” rather than “Dusten,” 
and misstated the day and year—actually 1981—of his birth.48 Maldonado 
claimed that she told the attorney this information was incorrect,49 but the 
Cherokee Nation did not receive correct information until five months 
later.50 The Cherokee Nation responded that they could not find records of 
Brown’s enrollment, but that “[a]ny incorrect or omitted family 
                                                                                                                     
 46. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554 (second alteration in original). 
 47. Letter from Phyllis Zimmerman, Tulsa Attorney, to Myra Reed, Cherokee Nation Indian 
Child Welfare Div. (Aug. 21, 2009), excerpted in Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 2, 
supra note 36 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 48. Id.; see also Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554; Testimony of Dusten Brown, supra 
note 26, at 475–76. 
 49. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554. 
 50. See id. at 555. 
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documentation could invalidate this determination.”51  
The August 21 letter is also interesting in other ways. First, as the letter 
shows, although usually described as Hispanic, Maldonado claimed, and 
later testified to, Cherokee heritage as well.52 Second, if Maldonado had in 
fact been working with the Capobiancos for four to five months, she had 
selected the family even before she ended her relationship with Brown.53 
On September 15, 2009, Maldonado gave birth to a little girl.54 She 
checked herself into the hospital as “strictly no report,” meaning that the 
hospital would tell anyone who called to inquire about Maldonado that she 
was not there.55 Maldonado testified that she had done this with her two 
previous births to avoid having the father of those children contact her.56 
Brown did not know that Maldonado was in the hospital and did not try to 
contact her there.57 The Capobiancos, however, were present at the birth.58 
In fact, Matthew Capobianco cut the umbilical cord59 —a much-repeated 
detail.60 Maldonado relinquished her parental rights the next morning,61 
although ICWA would not permit relinquishment until ten days after 
birth.62 After filing papers that did not indicate the baby’s Native American 
heritage with Oklahoma’s Interstate Compact on Child Placement agency, 
the Capobiancos received permission to remove her from the state, and 
took her home to South Carolina later that month.63  
The Capobiancos filed a petition to adopt Veronica on September 18, 
2009, but did not provide notice of the planned adoption to Brown until 
almost four months later, six days before Brown was scheduled to deploy 
to Iraq.64 Although no court made a specific finding that the errors in the 
notice to the Cherokee Nation or the delay in serving Brown were 
deliberate, it would not be surprising if they were. Studies have found 
                                                                                                                     
 51. Id. at 554 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 52. Id. at 554 n.5. 
 53. Melanie Duncan, however, testified that they first got into contact with Maldonado in late 
June. Testimony of Adoptive Mother—Cross Examination by Ms. Jones at 202, 2009-DR-10-3803 
(S.C. Fam. Ct. Sept. 13, 2011). 
 54. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 552. 
 55. Id. at 554 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56. Id. at 554 n.7. 
 57. See id.; Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 2, supra note 36. 
 58. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2558 (2013); Adoptive Couple, 
731 S.E.2d at 554; Id. at 571. 
 61. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554. 
 62. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (2012). 
 63. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554. As discussed below, had the papers indicated 
Veronica’s Cherokee heritage, the couple would not have been permitted to remove the baby from 
the state. See infra note 69. 
 64. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555. 
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widespread noncompliance with ICWA.65 Some of this non-compliance is 
due to ignorance or carelessness, but there is evidence that it is also part of 
a common technique to facilitate private adoptions of Indian children by 
non-Indians.66 By placing a child with a hopeful family before providing 
notice to a child’s parents or tribe, agencies may create “facts on the 
ground”67 that make it less likely that the original illegal placement will be 
disrupted. Further, although courts disagree, some have held that a long 
placement with a non-Indian family may provide “good cause” to deviate 
from ICWA’s placement preferences.68 
The failure to establish the applicability of ICWA until the Capobiancos 
returned to South Carolina may have been a key legal move as well. Had 
Oklahoma authorities known that ICWA applied, they would have refused 
                                                                                                                     
 65. See, e.g., Margaret Olesnavage et al., Disproportionate Minority Contact of American 
Indians/Alaska Natives in the Child Welfare System of Michigan, MICH. B.J., Jan. 2010, at 32 
(providing examples of ICWA non-compliance in Michigan); NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & N. 
AM. INDIAN LEGAL SERVS., INC., AN ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE 
ACT IN SOUTH DAKOTA: FINAL REPORT (2004) (analyzing surveys of ICWA noncompliance in South 
Dakota), available at http://www.sdtribalrelations.com/icwa/icwa04analysis.pdf; see also Brief for 
Wis. Tribes as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 
2552 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1308821, at *6, *10–13 (noting that between 2005 and 2007, 
Wisconsin tribes received notice in less than 18% of ICWA foster care and adoption cases, and 
documenting other violations). 
 66. See Brief for Ass’n on Am. Indian Affairs, Nat’l Congress of Am. Indians, Nat’l Indian 
Child Welfare Ass’n, Indian Tribes, and Other Indian Orgs. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1279462, at *17–18 
(discussing abusive adoption practices involving Indian children and noting that “Indian children 
were placed in foster care far more frequently than non-Indian children”); Brief for Wis. Tribes as 
Amici Curie, supra note 65, at 37–38 (discussing adoption practices in Wisconsin involving Indian 
children); John Echohawk et al., The Adoption Industry’s Ugly Side, POLITICO (Apr. 16, 2013, 5:21 
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/the-ugly-side-of-the-adoption-industry-90091.html 
(“All across this country – but especially in states that are home to multiple Native American Tribes 
– unethical adoption attorneys are purposely circumventing the federal law that is meant to protect 
Native American children.”); see, e.g., In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 517 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(reporting that the father in the case did not admit that he was Indian on an adoption form after 
being told that “the adoptions would be delayed or prevented if [Father’s] Indian ancestry were 
known”); In re Adoption of Infant Boy Crews, 803 P.2d 24, 27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (“[Adoption 
counselor] advised [the birth mother] not to mention her Indian blood to anyone, stating, ‘What I 
don’t hear, I don’t know.’”), aff’d, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992). 
 67. “Facts on the ground” is a diplomatic term first used to describe efforts to establish 
settlements in disputed parts of territory claimed by Israel, and thereby cement abstract claims to the 
territory with the reality of occupation by individuals and families. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, 
Facts on the Ground, in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 108–09 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. 
Peñalver eds., 2010).  Similarly, placing a child, even illegally, with a family makes it less likely 
that a court will later disturb the placement.  
 68. See In re Adoption of B.G.J., 111 P.3d 651, 659 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 133 P.3d 1 
(Kan. 2006); see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-1-102B.6. (2014) (recognizing that permanency is 
relevant to determining best interests of the child). 
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to permit Veronica’s removal from the state until they were satisfied that 
the placement complied with ICWA.69 Had the required notice to Brown 
and the tribe been made before Veronica’s placement with the 
Capobiancos, the Oklahoma courts would almost certainly have 
determined that Brown was entitled to custody under the act.70 Even if the 
Oklahoma courts had determined that Brown did not have rights under 
ICWA, Oklahoma law would require that he be provided with notice and 
an opportunity to establish that his efforts to parent his child had been 
thwarted before terminating his parental rights.71 Most important, had the 
case been considered without the backdrop of Veronica’s long placement 
with the Capobiancos, there would have been little reason to prevent a fit 
and loving father from parenting his child. 
On January 6, 2010, while Brown’s unit was on lockdown awaiting 
imminent deployment, the Washington County Sheriff’s Office of 
Oklahoma called Brown and told him that he had to come to Bartlesville to 
sign some paperwork.72 Brown was not allowed to travel to Bartlesville, 
but wangled permission to meet the process server at a mall parking lot 
near his army base.73 There, the process server gave Brown papers stating 
that Brown was not contesting the adoption of Baby Girl.74 Brown signed, 
                                                                                                                     
 69. See Cherokee Nation v. Nomura, 160 P.3d 967, 977 (Okla. 2007) (holding that the 
administrator of the Oklahoma Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children must ensure 
compliance with ICWA before allowing the child to be sent to another state for adoption). 
 70. Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 10 (“I find that Oklahoma would never have given 
consent for the child to be removed from the State of Oklahoma through the Interstate Compact for 
Placement of Children, had the Interstate Compact Application been correct.”); see also, e.g., In re 
Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d 1099 (Okla. 2004) (holding that ICWA applied to an unmarried mother’s 
attempt to place her child for adoption without the consent of the unmarried Indian father). Brown 
did initially file his action seeking custody in the Oklahoma courts, but the court properly dismissed 
the action in favor of the South Carolina courts given the pending action there. See Suzette Brewer, 
The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 3, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (June 4, 2013) 
[hereinafter Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 3], http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork. 
com/2013/06/04/fight-baby-veronica-part-3-149704. The adoptive couple filed their motion to 
dismiss six months to the day after Veronica had arrived in South Carolina, see Adoptive Couple v. 
Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 555 (S.C. 2010), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2552, invoking the jurisdictional 
provisions of both the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act § 201(a)(1) (1997) 
(providing jurisdiction to the state in which the child has resided for six months immediately 
preceding the action) and the Uniform Adoption Act § 3-101(a)(1) (1994) (providing jurisdiction to 
the state where a child has resided for the six months immediately preceding the action). See also 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7502-1.1 cmts. (2014) (discussing jurisdiction in adoption cases). 
 71. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7505-4.1C.1, 7505-4.2D. 
 72. See Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 1, supra note 45; Email from Chrissi 
Nimmo, Assistant Attorney Gen., Cherokee Nation, to Bethany R. Berger, Professor, Univ. of 
Conn. Sch. of Law (Mar. 18, 2014) (on file with author).  
 73. Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 1, supra note 45; see also Adoptive Couple, 
731 S.E.2d at 555, rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2552. 
 74. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555. 
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thinking that he was agreeing to relinquish his rights to Maldonado, but 
immediately realized his mistake.75 He testified that, “I then tried to grab 
the paper up. [The process server] told me that I could not grab that [sic] 
because . . . I would be going to jail if I was to do any harm to the paper.”76  
Immediately upon returning to Fort Sill, Brown contacted a Judge 
Advocate General lawyer on base, and with her assistance retained an 
attorney the next day.77 On January 11, 2010, Brown filed papers seeking a 
stay under the Servicemember’s Civil Relief Act, and on January 14 filed a 
complaint to establish paternity, custody, and child support of his 
daughter.78 Brown left for Iraq on January 18, leaving his father with 
power of attorney while he was abroad.79 In the meantime, the Cherokee 
Nation intervened in the case in April 2010, and court-ordered paternity 
testing in May confirmed that Brown was Veronica’s father.80  
Brown returned from Iraq in December 2010, but the family court did 
not hold a hearing on the matter until September 2011.81 On September 29, 
2011, Judge Deborah Malphrus issued an order from the bench finding that 
ICWA applied to the case, that terminating Brown’s parental rights would 
not be in Veronica’s interests, and that it would be best for all concerned to 
quickly transfer Veronica to Brown, on October 15, 2011.82 The judge 
found that even if ICWA did not apply, South Carolina law would prevent 
termination because Brown was a “thwarted father” who had tried to 
support and care for his child, but who had been prevented from doing so 
by the birth mother’s deliberate efforts.83 Judge Malphrus declared that 
although the “[a]doptive [c]ouple have had this child in their care for two 
years, a child is not property, and the right to custody cannot ripen simply 
by virtue of the passage of time. Custody and parental rights cannot be 
gained by adverse possession.”84  
On November 25, 2011, the judge issued a written opinion reiterating, 
in most respects, her earlier order.85 Although she reversed the finding that 
                                                                                                                     
 75.  Id. 
 76. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. The complaint was originally filed in Oklahoma, but the Oklahoma courts dismissed 
the lawsuit in favor of the case pending in South Carolina. See Brewer, The Fight for Baby 
Veronica, Part 3, supra note 70; see also Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 571 n.42 (Kittredge, J., 
dissenting). 
 79. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 555 n.11, 556. 
 82. Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 10, 17–19. 
 83. See id. at 13. 
 84. Id. at 17. 
 85. See Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 552. 
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Brown was a thwarted father under South Carolina law,86 Judge Malphrus 
wrote that “[t]he undisputed testimony is that he is a loving and devoted 
father [to his other daughter]. Even [Mother] herself testified that [Father] 
was a good father. There is no evidence to suggest that he would be 
anything other than an excellent parent to this child,” and “[Father] has 
convinced me of his unwavering love for this child.”87 The judge 
concluded that “[w]hen parental rights and the best interests of the child 
are in conflict, the best interests of the child must prevail. However, in this 
case, I find no conflict between the two.”88  
Judge Malphrus also rejected the “existing Indian family” exception,89 
which some courts have used to deny application of ICWA when the 
involved family does not have a meaningful connection with an Indian 
tribe.90 However, Judge Malphrus also found that, even if the exception 
was good law, it would not apply to the facts of this case given Brown and 
his family’s strong connection to the Cherokee Nation and its culture:  
I find [Father] is a Cherokee in more than name only, and 
there is, in fact an existing Indian family. There was ample 
testimony to support that [Father’s] heritage and culture are 
very important to him and always had been . . . [T]here was 
evidence in [the home of Father and his family] reflecting 
their pride and connection to the [Cherokee] Nation and the 
Wolf Clan. I find that [Father] has a strong cultural tie to the 
Cherokee Nation.91   
The appellate court granted a temporary stay of execution of the order, 
but lifted it on December 30, 2011.92 The Capobiancos transferred 
Veronica to the Browns on December 31, 2011.93 By this time, the 
Capobiancos had retained a local public relations firm, and a phalanx of 
reporters was waiting at the scene of the hand off.94 
                                                                                                                     
 86. See Email from Chrissi Nimmo, Assistant Attorney Gen., Cherokee Nation, to Bethany R. 
Berger, Professor, Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law (Feb. 2, 2014) (on file with author); see also infra 
notes 332–38 and accompanying text. 
 87. Brief in Opposition, supra note 30, at *9 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (first, third, and fourth alteration in original). 
 88. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 566 (alteration in original) (quoting the family court). 
 89. Id. at 556. 
 90. See id. at 558 n.17. 
 91. Brief in Opposition, supra note 30, at *8–9 (alterations in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 92. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 556. 
 93. Id. at 552. 
 94. Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 3, supra note 70. The Capobiancos’ attorney 
changed the location of the hand off from their home to the Omni Hotel at the last minute. Id. Upon 
checking out the location and seeing the swarm of cameras, Sharon Jones, one of Brown’s 
attorneys, refused to conduct the hand off there and told the Capobiancos to meet Brown where he 
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Although this Article discusses the details of the legal dispute in the 
next Section, the subsequent proceedings are also important to an 
understanding of the case’s facts. On July 26, 2012, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court affirmed Judge Malphrus’s family court decision.95 On 
June 25, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.96 On July 17, 2013, 
without holding a hearing on Veronica’s interests, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court ordered the adoption finalized and Veronica immediately 
transferred to the Capobiancos.97 In early August, Brown turned himself in 
to Oklahoma authorities rather than hand her over.98 The Oklahoma 
authorities stayed extradition pending a hearing, and, in the meantime, 
ordered the parties to submit to mediation.99 Finally, after mediation broke 
down and the Oklahoma Supreme Court lifted its emergency stay of 
execution,100 Brown relinquished Veronica to the Capobiancos on 
September 23, 2013, eight days after her fourth birthday.101  
There is no question that the Capobiancos provided a good home for 
Veronica. Because there has been no factual hearing since Veronica’s 
transfer in December 2011, there are no judicial findings regarding her 
family life with the Browns (Brown remarried in 2009; Veronica knew his 
wife Robin as “Mommy”).102 Newspaper articles suggest that Veronica 
thrived with the Browns as well, and was a happy, bubbly child who loved 
her parents, enjoyed her pink and purple room and helping tend the ducks, 
geese, and horses at her grandparents’ farm, was attached to her half-sister, 
and gleefully participated in Cherokee stomp dances at weekly classes with 
                                                                                                                     
was waiting at her office. Id. Brown and Veronica remained in Jones’ office until the reporters gave 
up and went away. Id. 
 95. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 552. 
 96. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2257 (2013). 
 97. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 346, 347 (S.C. 2013). 
 98. See Craig Day & Lacie Lowry, Baby Veronica Dad Turns Self in to Oklahoma 
Authorities, Resists Extradition, NEWS ON 6 (Aug. 12, 2013, 8:33 AM), http://www.newson6.com/ 
story/23109019/cherokee-court-holds-emergency-hearing-for-baby-veronica; see also Brandi Ball, 
Arrest Warrant Issued for Biological Father of Baby Veronica, NEWS ON 6 (Aug. 10, 2013, 1:43 
PM), http://www.newson6.com/story/23100247/report-arrest-warrant-issued-for-biological-father-
of-baby-veronica. 
 99. Email from Chrissi Nimmo, Assistant Attorney Gen., Cherokee Nation, to Bethany R. 
Berger, Professor, Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law (Mar. 18, 2014) (on file with author). 
 100. See Brown v. DeLapp, 312 P.3d 918, 918 (Okla. 2013). 
 101. Michael Overall, Baby Veronica Case: Dusten Brown to Stop Custody Fight for 
Veronica, TULSA WORLD (Oct. 10, 2013, 5:55 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/baby-
veronica-case-dusten-brown-to-stop-custody-fight-for/article_2d903520-319a-11e3-abf1-0019bb 
30f31a.html; see also Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d 550, 552 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2552 
(2013) (stating that Veronica was born on September 15, 2009). 
 102. Oklahomanews, Baby Veronica Case aired 7-12-13 (July 15, 2013), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t4vfBX2oAUw. 
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other children.103 Although some of these reports are from sympathetic fora 
like Indian Country Today, others come from the Oklahoma TV News104 
and the Charleston, South Carolina Post and Courier.105 All available 
evidence suggests that Veronica has had two loving, happy homes and, at 
four years old, had to leave the second one and return to the first.  
B.  The Legal Battle 
Indian law cases usually occupy an obscure backwater in the Supreme 
Court docket. Justices have described them as “pee wee” and even 
“chickenshit” cases.106 Not so with Adoptive Couple. The Copabiancos 
were represented by Lisa Blatt, who has argued more cases before the 
Supreme Court than any other woman in private practice and has won all 
but one.107 Guardian ad Litem Jo Prowell, an aggressive participant in the 
litigation, was represented by Paul Clement.108 Clement is perhaps the 
most active Supreme Court litigator in the country; his recent high profile 
cases include arguments against the constitutionality of the Affordable 
Care Act, the Voting Rights Act, and for the constitutionality of the 
Defense of Marriage Act.109 Maldonado submitted an amicus brief 
authored by Gregory Garre (former U.S. Solicitor General and clerk for 
Justice William Rehnquist) and Lori Alvino McGill (former clerk for 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).110 Amicus briefs supporting reversal were 
                                                                                                                     
 103. See Suzette Brewer, Inseparable Sisters: Adoption Order Exacts Toll on Baby Veronica’s 
Family, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (July 19, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymed 
ianetwork.com/2013/07/19/inseparable-sisters-adoption-order-exacts-toll-baby-veronicas-family-
150500; Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 1, supra note 45; Andrew Knapp, To 
Oklahoma’s American Indian Tribes, Veronica is a Battle Cry for Cultures, POST & COURIER, (Aug. 
17, 2013), http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20130817/PC16/130819408. 
 104. E.g., Oklahomanews, supra note 102. 
 105. See Knapp, supra note 103. 
 106. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 57–58, 359 (1979) (quoting 
Justices John Marshall Harlan and William J. Brennan). 
 107. See Vanessa O’Connell, A Chat with Lisa Blatt, a Record-Holding Supreme Court 
Litigator, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 20, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/01/20/a-
chat-with-lisa-blatt-a-record-holding-supreme-court-litigator/; Lisa S. Blatt, ARNOLD & PORTER 
LLP, http://www.arnoldporter.com/professionals.cfm?action=view&id=5409 (last visited Jan. 12, 
2015). 
 108. Response of Guardian Ad Litem ex rel. Baby Girl, in Support of Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 1, 20, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12–399). 
 109. David G. Savage, Lawyer Relishes Tough and Unpopular Cases Before Supreme Court, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/26/nation/la-na-court-clement-
20111226. 
 110. Brief for Birth Mother as Amica Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14, Adoptive Couple, 
133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12–399); Gregory G. Garre, U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/osg/bio/gregory-g-garre (last visited Jan. 12, 2015); Lori Alvino McGill, 
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, http://www.quinnemanuel.com/attorneys/mcgill-
lori-alvino-.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
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also filed by the American Academy of Adoption Attorneys, the National 
Council on Adoption, the County Welfare Officers of California, and law 
professors Joan Heifetz Hollinger and Elizabeth Bartholet, the latter a 
passionate advocate of transracial adoption.111 
Brown was represented by the Yale Law School Supreme Court Clinic, 
led by Charles Rothfeld, another star Supreme Court litigator.112 The 
United States also weighed in on the respondents’ behalf; Deputy Solicitor 
General Edwin Kneedler argued the U.S. position.113 The twenty-two 
amicus briefs supporting Birth Father and Baby Girl included many from 
Indian tribes and organizations as well as one from the ACLU; one from 
current and former members of congress (written by Kathleen Sullivan, 
former Dean of Stanford Law School and another Supreme Court 
superstar);114 one from the attorneys general of eighteen different states; 
one from a number of churches and religious organizations; one from the 
Minnesota Department of Human Services; and one from eighteen leading 
child welfare organizations (written by Patricia Millett, the woman who 
has argued the second most cases before the Supreme Court).115   
This concentration of attorney firepower was not a reflection of the 
complexity or conflict below regarding the legal issues in the case. The 
case appeared to involve dry questions of statutory construction, and, as 
SCOTUSblog opined, the “plain language of the [statute]” appeared to 
encompass this situation.116 The first question was whether Brown was a 
“parent” under § 1903(9) of ICWA,117 which defines the term to mean 
                                                                                                                     
 111. Brief for the Am. Acad. of Adoption Attorneys as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12–399); Brief for Nat’l Council for Adoption as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12–399); Brief for Professor 
Joan Heifetz Hollinger and Professor Elizabeth Bartholet, Ctr. for Adoption Policy, and Advokids 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent Baby Girl and Reversal, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 
(No. 12–399); Brief of the Cal. State Ass’n of Counties and the Cnty. Welfare Dirs. Ass’n of Cal. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12–399). 
 112. Tony Mauro, Brief of the Week: Star Advocates Face Off in High-Profile Adoption Case, 
NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202580249740? (LexisNexis 
subscription required). 
 113. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Adoptive 
Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399); Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, OYEZ PROJECT, 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_12_399 (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
 114. Kathleen M. Sullivan, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, 
http://www.quinnemanuel.com/attorneys/sullivan-kathleen-m.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
 115. O’Connell, supra note 107. For a helpful compilation of briefs, see Matthew L.M. 
Fletcher, Turtle Talk Guide to the Amici Supporting Respondents in Baby Veronica Case (Adoptive 
Couple v. Baby Girl), TURTLE TALK (Mar. 29, 2013), http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2013/03/29/
turtle-talk-guide-to-the-amici-supporting-respondents-in-baby-veronica-case-adoptive-couple-v-
baby-girl/.  
 116. Amy Howe, Argument Preview: Court to Take on Law and Emotion in Indian Adoption 
Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 13, 2013, 8:40 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=162343. 
 117. Id.; see also Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2559–60. 
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“any biological parent . . . of an Indian child,” but excludes “the unwed 
father where paternity has not been acknowledged or established.”118 
Although most courts apply state law standards to determine whether 
paternity has been acknowledged or established, all would consider the 
steps Brown took—filing an assertion of paternity and having it judicially 
established via DNA testing—to be sufficient.119 Yet the Supreme Court 
did not even resolve this question, assuming without deciding that Brown 
was a parent under ICWA.120  
The second question was whether the standards ICWA establishes for 
involuntary termination of parental rights applied to a father who had not 
had custody of his child.121 Section 1912 as a whole governs involuntary 
child welfare proceedings in state court.122 Whereas, § 1913, in contrast, 
governs voluntary consent to foster care and termination of parental 
rights.123 Section 1912(a) requires notice to a child’s parent and tribe at 
least ten days before any involuntary foster care placement or termination 
of parental rights.124 Section 1912(b) provides for court-ordered counsel 
for any indigent parent in any “removal, placement, or termination 
proceeding,” while § 1912(c) provides all parties with the right to examine 
all records in the case. 125 Section 1912(d) provides that the party seeking 
foster care placement or termination of parental rights must show that 
active remedial efforts had been made “to prevent the breakup of the Indian 
family.”126 Section 1912(e) provides that foster care placement may not be 
ordered absent “clear and convincing evidence . . . that the continued 
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to the child,” while § 1912(f) 
provides that termination of parental rights may not be ordered absent 
evidence “beyond a reasonable doubt” of such harm.127  
The South Carolina Supreme Court found that because the adoptive 
couple had not established serious harm to Veronica from her father’s 
custody or that efforts had been made to prevent family breakup as 
                                                                                                                     
 118. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2012). 
 119. See Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966, 978–79 (Alaska 2011) (summarizing cases from 
various states that demonstrate the sufficiency of affirmative steps to acknowledge paternity); see 
also Brief of the States, supra note 25, at 16–22 (discussing case law and arguing that Brown 
satisfied standards established by state courts). 
 120. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560. 
 121. See Howe, supra note 116; see also Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560–62. 
 122. 25 U.S.C. § 1912. 
 123. Id. § 1913. 
 124. Id. § 1912(a). 
 125. Id. § 1912(b)–(c). 
 126. Id. § 1912(d). 
 127. Id. § 1912(e)–(f). 
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required by §§ 1912(d) and (f), parental rights could not be terminated.128 
Petitioners argued, however, that even if Brown was a parent, and was thus 
required to receive notice and court-appointed counsel in a termination of 
parental rights proceeding under § 1912, none of the standards § 1912 
requires for involuntary termination applied because he did not presently 
have custody of Veronica.129 Rather, only state law standards applied, and 
in South Carolina, unwed fathers, like Brown, had no defenses at all 
against termination of their parental rights.130 This proposition makes no 
sense in light of the rest of § 1912—would Congress really require 
numerous procedural protections for parents facing involuntary termination 
of parental rights only to permit the termination to proceed without any 
substantive defense? And yet this is the conclusion that five members of 
the Supreme Court reached.131  
Starting with the words “continued custody” in § 1912(f), the Court 
determined that they included only custody by someone who already had 
legal or physical custody.132 This certainly is one meaning of the term. As 
Justice Antonin Scalia pointed out in his dissent, however, “continued 
custody” could also refer to custody that was “not merely that initial or 
temporary custody” but protracted or without interruption in the future.133 
Scalia’s interpretation is also far more consistent with the structure of 
§ 1912 as a whole, which deals generally with involuntary terminations, 
and gives significant rights in such proceedings to unmarried fathers who 
have acknowledged paternity.134  
The Court then defined custody to mean physical or legal custody as 
defined by state law.135 Because mothers have legal custody of illegitimate 
children in the absence of a contrary court order, the substantive 
requirements of § 1912(f) did not apply.136 This was actually a far more 
radical proposition than argued by Petitioners, who only asserted that 
Brown lacked legal rights because he had not provided the financial 
support necessary under South Carolina law to provide unmarried fathers 
                                                                                                                     
 128. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 562–64 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 
2552 (2013). 
 129. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 7–8, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12–399). 
 130. See id. 
 131. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556–57. 
 132. Id. at 2560. 
 133. Id. at 2571–72 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2577 n.6 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(agreeing with Scalia’s proposition). 
 134. See id. at 2573 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that interpreting § 1912 through two 
words at the end of the statute is a “textually backward reading” that “misapprehends ICWA’s 
structure and scope”). 
 135. See id. at 2562 (majority opinion). 
 136. Id. 
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with the right to contest termination of parental rights in adoptions.137 State 
laws differ on when unwed fathers have such rights, with a number of 
states according greater rights than South Carolina.138  
Virtually all state statutes, however, provide that unmarried mothers 
have legal custody of their children until otherwise established.139 Because 
at least 67% of Indian children are born to unmarried parents,140 this would 
prevent most fathers who do not live with their children from seeking 
custody under § 1912(f).141  
But the Court’s holding could be given a less sweeping interpretation. 
In places, the Court claimed that its ruling was limited to a “parent who 
abandoned his or her child prior to birth and never had physical or legal 
custody.”142 Further, Justice Stephen Breyer stated in concurrence that the 
Court was not deciding the case of a “father with visitation rights or a 
father who has paid ‘all of his child support obligations,’ [or] special 
circumstances such as a father who was deceived about the existence of the 
child or a father who was prevented from supporting his child.”143 Later 
courts may find that Adoptive Couple does not apply to parents who at 
some time had significant contact with or responsibility for their children. 
The legal rule announced by the majority, however, does not clearly 
exclude such cases—such fathers do not have “legal or physical custody” 
under state law,144 and therefore would not appear to have any rights under 
the standards applied in the case.  
The Court also held that fathers like Brown are not entitled to any 
protections under § 1912(d), which requires that “active efforts” be made 
to prevent the breakup of the Indian family before termination or foster 
care placement.145 That this provision was “adjacent” to § 1912(e) and (f), 
the Court stated, “strongly suggests that the phrase ‘breakup of the Indian 
family’ should be read in harmony with the ‘continued custody’ 
                                                                                                                     
 137. Brief for Petitioners, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 633597, 
at *25–26. 
 138. See Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966, 978–79 (Alaska 2011) (summarizing case law from 
several states on the issue of establishing paternity). 
 139. See 1 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 7:10, at 598 (rev. 2d ed. 2005). 
 140. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Births: Final Data for 2012, 62 NAT’L VITAL 
STATISTICS REPS. 9 tbl.13 (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62
_09.pdf. This report undercounts as it tracks nonmarital births by the race of the mother, not the 
father, and thus misses cases in which the father, but not the mother, was American Indian. 
 141. See Brief of Wis. Tribes, supra note 65, at 20–21 (noting that 95% of all voluntary 
relinquishments are by unmarried mothers). 
 142. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2563 n.8. 
 143. Id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2578 & n.8 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting)). 
 144.  See id. at 2562 (majority opinion). 
 145. Id. at 2557; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2012). 
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requirement.”146 It is not clear why a restrictive reading of language after 
the language construed “strongly suggests” that the restriction should be 
used to narrow earlier parts of the statute. The Court found, however, that 
because Brown did not have legal or physical custody, there was no family 
breakup in terminating Veronica’s legal relationship to him.147  
In summary, although the Court assumed that Brown was a parent 
under ICWA, and left untouched the requirements that such parents have 
rights to notice, counsel, intervention, and examination of all records in 
any involuntary termination proceedings, it rendered those rights 
essentially meaningless. While state law might require some kind of 
substantive showing before parental rights could be terminated, the 
substantive standards in ICWA simply did not apply.  
A few state courts in the 1980s limited ICWA’s application in cases 
involving unmarried Indian fathers, but these cases were based primarily 
on those courts’ interpretation of the overall purposes of the statute, rather 
than construction of the actual words of the statute. In the first of these 
cases, In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.,148 the Kansas Supreme Court held 
that ICWA did not apply at all in a case where the father never had custody 
of his child, because there was no “existing Indian family” to break up.149 
But courts and legislatures have since generally rejected this “existing 
Indian family exception,” even in several of the states that originally 
adopted it.150  
                                                                                                                     
 146. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2563. 
 147. Id. at 2562. It is true that the South Carolina Supreme Court was somewhat confused 
about when the “active efforts” requirement would apply, suggesting that for a father who was not 
interested in having a relationship with his child this would mandate measures “attempting to 
stimulate [Biological] Father’s desire to be a parent.” Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 
550, 562 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2552. The majority understandably had some fun with such 
a requirement. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2563–64 & n.9. But if § 1912 is correctly read only to 
apply to involuntary terminations of parental rights, no such “active efforts” would be required for 
fathers not interested in parenting their children. 
 148. 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009). 
 149. See id. at 175–76; accord In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) 
(refusing to apply § 1912(d) and (f) to a case both because the unmarried father did not qualify as a 
parent and because there was no “Indian family” to preserve). In re S.A.M. did state briefly that the 
child in that case was not in the appellant’s “continued” custody, but did not rest its opinion on this 
holding. Id. at 607; see also In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1063–64 (Okla. 1985) 
(holding noncustodial unmarried father did not have standing to object to adoption or invoke 
protections of §§ 1911, 1912, and 1913 because the child had not been part of an “existing Indian 
environment”), overruled by In re Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d 1099 (Okla. 2004). 
 150. See ROBERT ANDERSON, BETHANY R. BERGER, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & SARAH KRAKOFF, 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 512 (2010) (listing six states and one appellate 
division in California that follow the “existing Indian family” doctrine and fifteen states and one 
appellate division in New York that reject it). 
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Like those early state court decisions, in Adoptive Couple the U.S. 
Supreme Court rested its opinion, in part, on its finding that ICWA “was 
primarily intended to stem the unwarranted removal of Indian children 
from intact Indian families.”151 State courts were forced to acknowledge 
that Congress had other important goals in ICWA,152 particularly after 
1989, when the Supreme Court decided Mississippi Choctaw v. 
Holyfield,153 its sole previous case on the act, strongly affirming ICWA’s 
application to twins voluntarily relinquished for adoption at birth.154 
Although the Court in Adoptive Couple declined Petitioners’ invitation to 
adopt the existing Indian family exception,155 by echoing the pre-Holyfield 
narrow interpretation of congressional purpose and providing a way to 
evade application of ICWA through construction of its statutory language, 
the decision may breathe new life into the generally rejected doctrine. 
With little discussion, the Supreme Court also eviscerated the 
substantive standard that applies to both voluntary and involuntary 
placements under ICWA. Section 1915(a) provides that: 
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State 
law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause 
to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the 
child’s extended family; (2) other members of the Indian 
child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.156 
Some courts have found that factors such as birth-parent preference and 
long placement with a prospective family might contribute to “good cause” 
to deviate from the placement preferences.157 The Supreme Court, 
                                                                                                                     
 151. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2561. 
 152. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2)–(5), 1902 (2012) (referring to congressional “responsibility for 
the protection and preservation of Indian tribes,” the fact that “there is no resource that is more vital 
to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children,” the placement of 
children in “non-Indian foster and adoptive homes,” and policies to “promote the stability and 
security of Indian tribes and families”). 
 153. 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
 154. Id. at 53. 
 155. See Marcia A. Zug, The Real Impact of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: The Existing 
Indian Family Doctrine Is Not Affirmed, but the Future of the ICWA’s Placement Preferences Is 
Jeopardized, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 327, 339 (2013).  
 156. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a), declared unconstitutional as applied by In re Santos Y., 92 Cal. 
App. 4th 1274, 1312 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 157. See, e.g., id. § 1915(c) (providing that parental preference could be considered in 
appropriate circumstances); In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Alaska 1993) 
(concluding that mother’s preference for placement with non-Indian adoptive parents was an 
appropriate factor in finding good cause); In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action No. A–
25525, 667 P.2d 228, 234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (finding good cause where child had resided with 
adoptive mother for three years). But see In re T.S.W., 276 P.3d 133, 145 (Kan. 2012) (concluding 
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however, held that the placement preferences were completely 
“inapplicable in cases where no alternative party has formally sought to 
adopt the child. This is because there simply is no ‘preference’ to apply if 
no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has 
come forward.”158  
If taken at face value, this holding completely undermines the statutory 
requirement; henceforward, to evade compliance with the preferences one 
only need keep the proposed placement for adoption secret until a family 
has filed to adopt the child. Because there would be “no alternative party” 
at that moment, the placement preferences would not apply. Before 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, no one assumed that Congress intended the 
statute to be so easily evaded. Indeed, the guidelines promulgated by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs suggested the contrary, stating that one of the 
factors in determining good cause was “[t]he unavailability of suitable 
families for placement after a diligent search has been completed for 
families meeting the preference criteria.”159 State statutes,160 judicial 
decisions,161 and federal guidelines162 all agree that § 1915 requires, at a 
minimum, reasonable efforts to find a suitable family meeting the 
preferences.  
It might be possible to avoid this result by reading the majority opinion 
to permit application of the placement preferences in situations in which 
individuals outside the preferences initially file for adoption, but a family 
within the preferences files before the adoption is finalized.163 The court 
would then determine whether the second family was suitable for the child, 
and whether good cause existed to finalize adoption with the first family 
instead. Justice Breyer suggested this in his concurrence, asking whether 
                                                                                                                     
parental preference alone cannot constitute good cause); In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 
364 (Minn. 1994) (holding it improper to find that long placement alone constituted good cause). 
 158. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2564 (2013). 
 159. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 
67,594 (Nov. 26, 1979). 
 160. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.31(k) (West 2014) (requiring documentation of 
efforts to find placement complying with the preferences); IOWA CODE § 232B.9(8) (2014) 
(requiring documentation of “active efforts” to comply with the preferences), declared 
unconstitutional by In re N.N.E., 752 N.W.2d 1 (2008); WIS. STAT. § 48.028(7)(e) (2014) 
(determining the existence of good cause to depart from placement preference based on 
considerations of whether a preferential placement is unavailable only after diligent efforts have 
been made). 
 161. See, e.g., In re Welfare of S.N.R., 617 N.W.2d 77, 84–85 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) 
(rejecting application to deviate from placement preferences where, among other things, there was 
no showing of unavailability of homes after diligent search). 
 162. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67,594–
95. 
 163. See Zug, supra note 155, at 349–50 (arguing that this is the correct reading of Adoptive 
Couple) 
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§ 1915 could “allow an absentee father to reenter the special statutory order 
of preference with support from the tribe, and subject to a court’s 
consideration of ‘good cause?’ I raise, but do not here try to answer, the 
question.”164  
On remand, however, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected this 
alternative interpretation, although both Brown and his parents had by then 
filed adoption petitions in the Oklahoma and Cherokee courts. The court 
held: 
[A]t the time Adoptive Couple sought to institute adoption 
proceedings, they were the only party interested in adopting 
her. Because no other party has sought adoptive placement in 
this action, § 1915 has no application in concluding this 
matter, nor may that section be invoked at the midnight hour 
to further delay the resolution of this case. We find the clear 
import of the Supreme Court’s majority opinion to foreclose 
successive § 1915 petitions, for litigation must have finality, 
and it is the role of this court to ensure “the sanctity of the 
adoption process” under state law is “jealously guarded.”165 
Although the language refers to “the time the Adoptive Couple sought 
to institute adoption proceedings,” one might read the decision to be based 
on the fact that the petitions to adopt came years after the litigation began. 
This condemnation of the “midnight hour” petition seems bizarrely 
punitive, considering it was used to bar a biological father who since the 
moment he was provided with notice of the proposed adoption has sought 
custody of his child, and which every court had held he had a right to until 
a couple of months earlier. 
Why did the Court thus do violence to ICWA’s statutory text and 
purpose? Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurrence states that both Petitioner 
and Respondent “put forward a plausible interpretation of the relevant 
sections of the Indian Child Welfare Act,” but he joined with the majority 
opinion because it better accorded with his belief that an originalist reading 
of the Indian Commerce Clause should end federal Indian law as we know 
it.166 Without elaboration, the majority opinion referred vaguely to 
potential “equal protection concerns,”167 but when examined, these 
                                                                                                                     
 164. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2571 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
 165. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 51, 53 (S.C. 2013) (quoting Gardner v. Baby 
Edward, 342 S.E.2d 601, 603 (S.C. 1986)). 
 166. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565–71 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
Indian Commerce Clause does not support ICWA, or indeed any congressional action not having to 
do with commerce and trade). For a powerful argument that Justice Thomas was wrong in his 
assertion that the original understanding of constitutional federal Indian power was limited to trade, 
see Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1028–32 (2015).  
 167. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565. 
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concerns are legally evanescent. For the four Justices beside Thomas, this 
Article argues, the opinion cannot be justified on statutory or constitutional 
foundations, but only on ill-founded policy beliefs. Prodded a little, these 
beliefs reveal divisions as to race, gender, and class, and misunderstanding 
of the roles they played in the case and in Indian adoptions in general. 
II.  THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD? 
The obvious response to the arguments in this Article is that Adoptive 
Couple was decided based on the best interests of a child, not her or her 
parents’ race, or gender, or anything else. This claim has two parts: first, 
that ICWA undermined Veronica’s best interests; second, that holding 
ICWA applies to cases like this would harm Indian children in general. 
Both claims, however, fall apart on further examination.  
Regarding the first part of the claim, after a four-day hearing with 
numerous witnesses and two experts, the family court specifically found 
that placing Veronica with her birth father was in Veronica’s interests.168 
The evidence was “undisputed” that Brown was an “excellent parent” and 
would love and care for Veronica.169 Judge Malphrus wrote that “‘[w]hen 
parental rights and the best interests of the child are in conflict, the best 
interests of the child must prevail,’” but “‘in this case, I find no conflict 
between the two.’”170 The family court and South Carolina Supreme Court 
also found—consistent with psychological literature—that the healthy 
attachment Veronica presumably had to the Capobiancos would likely 
enable her to bond to Brown and his family without lasting harm.171 All 
reports suggest that these courts were correct and that Veronica thrived 
with her birth father and his wife.172 The claim that the decision to reverse 
the family court was about Veronica’s interests is further belied by the 
2013 decision to remove Veronica after two years with her father without 
even a factual hearing as to her best interests.  
There is also no evidence that ICWA has harmed Indian children by 
interfering with warranted adoptions or their permanency. Although Justice 
Samuel Alito wrote forebodingly that Respondent’s interpretation of 
ICWA “would put certain vulnerable children at a great disadvantage” 
because “many prospective adoptive parents would surely pause before 
adopting any child who might possibly qualify as an Indian under the 
ICWA,”173 this assertion is simply implausible given the great demand for 
                                                                                                                     
 168. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 552, 563, 565–66 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 133 
S. Ct. 2552. 
 169. Brief in Opposition, supra note 30, at *9–10. 
 170. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 566 (alteration in original) (quoting family court). 
 171. See id. at 563. 
 172. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  
 173. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565. 
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healthy adoptable babies. Since the 1920s, a continuous “baby famine” has 
led to repeated scandals regarding black-market and illegal adoptions.174 
Decreasing stigma attached to single motherhood; far greater employment, 
childcare, and welfare options for women; and greater availability of birth 
control and abortion have radically reduced the supply of adoptable infants 
since the 1970s.175 Before 1973, 8.7% of infants born to all single mothers 
and 19.3% of those born to white single mothers were relinquished for 
adoption at birth;176 by 2002, however, only 1% of infants born to all single 
mothers, and only 1.3% of those born to white single mothers were 
relinquished at birth.177 In this same period, the percentage of births to 
unmarried mothers has not even doubled.178   
While the supply of adoptable infants is just a small fraction of what it 
was in the 1970s, the demand for adoption has not similarly declined. One 
estimate is that there are about six families seeking to adopt for every 
completed adoption.179 Although the excess demand for adoptable babies 
led adopters to look overseas for children, the supply there is also 
dwindling, partly as a result of the United States’ 2008 accession to the 
1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in 
Respect of Intercountry Adoption.180 The reduction is also due to efforts by 
                                                                                                                     
 174. LAURA BRIGGS, SOMEBODY’S CHILDREN: THE POLITICS OF TRANSRACIAL AND 
TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION 6–7 (2012). 
 175. See id. at 7; see also EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INSTITUTE, SAFEGUARDING THE 
RIGHTS AND WELL-BEING OF BIRTHPARENTS IN THE ADOPTION PROCESS 7 (rev. 2007). Although the 
increase in age-related infertility may be thought to be a potential cause of the increased demand for 
adoption, it is not clear that there is a net increase in infertile couples given the dramatic advances 
in fertility treatment. What is clear, as discussed infra Section V.C, is that today infertility is not 
simply a biological issue, but a class issue, as upper-middle-class women are far more likely to defer 
childbearing for education or work. 
 176. ANJANI CHANDRA ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ADOPTION, 
ADOPTION SEEKING, AND RELINQUISHMENT FOR ADOPTION IN THE UNITED STATES 9 tbl.5 (1999). 
 177. JO JONES, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, WHO ADOPTS? CHARACTERISTICS 
OF WOMEN AND MEN WHO HAVE ADOPTED CHILDREN 5 fig.6 (2009); cf. MADELYN FREUNDLICH, 
ADOPTION AND ETHICS: THE MARKET FORCES IN ADOPTION 8–9 (2000) (noting that only about 1% of 
babies born to unmarried mothers were placed for adoption from 1989–1995). 
 178. See JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, BIRTHS: FINAL 
DATA FOR 2012, at tbl.16 (2013) (noting the percentage of births to unmarried women was 26.4% in 
1970, 43.6% in 2002, and 45.3% in 2012). 
 179. JO JONES, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ADOPTION EXPERIENCES OF 
WOMEN AND MEN AND DEMAND FOR CHILDREN TO ADOPT BY WOMEN 18–44 YEARS OF AGE IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 2002, at 4, 19 tbl.1 (2008); FREUNDLICH, supra note 177, at 8–9 (“The data suggest 
a ratio of approximately six adoption seekers for every actual adoption.”) . 
 180. See Chiaki Moriguchi, The Evolution of Child Adoption in the United States, 1950–2010: 
An Economic Analysis of Historical Trends 8–9 (Inst. of Econ. Research, Hitotsubashi Univ. 
Discussion Paper Series A, Paper No. 572, 2012), http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/
10086/23103/1/DP572.pdf. See generally Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation 
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important sending countries such as South Korea,181 Liberia,182 Russia, 
China,183 and Guatemala,184 to limit or shut down adoptions in the face of 
allegations of corruption and baby trafficking.  
Related to the argument that ICWA would keep adoptive children from 
finding homes was the argument that ICWA represents a legally sanctioned 
form of “race matching,” which denies needy children adoptions by 
willing parents solely because they are not the same race.185 While race 
matching was once both the law and practice of adoption,186 it endures 
                                                                                                                     
in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, HCCH (May 29, 1993), http://www.hcch.net/upload/
conventions/txt33en.pdf. 
 181. See Intercountry Adoption Notice, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Korea 
Begins Implementing Special Adoption Act (Jan. 25, 2013), available at 
http://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/alerts-and-notices/south-
korea-1.html (providing notice of a South Korean law prioritizing domestic adoptions and requiring 
family court approval of all inter-country adoptions). 
 182. KATHRYN JOYCE, THE CHILD CATCHERS: RESCUE, TRAFFICKING, AND THE NEW GOSPEL OF 
ADOPTION, at x (2013) (noting that Liberia shut down international adoption after numerous 
complaints about unethical adoption practices, including allegations of child trafficking). 
 183. Kevin Voigt & Sophie Brown, International adoptions in decline as number of orphans 
grows, CNN (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/world/international-adoption-main-
story-decline/.  
 184. Moriguchi, supra note 180, at 16; Rachel L. Swarns, A Family, for a Few Days a Year, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/world/americas/stalled-adoption-
program-in-guatemala-leaves-families-in-limbo.html (discussing effect of Guatemalan shut down of 
adoptions, as well as U.S. restrictions on adoptions from countries like Vietnam and Cambodia). 
 185. RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 
480, 518 (2003) (calling ICWA “the last stand of open race matching in America,” and arguing that 
it “decrease[s] the likelihood that needy children will find adoptive homes, popularize[s] hurtful 
superstitions, and reinforce[s] claims that unfairly stigmatize substantial numbers of non-Indian 
adoptive parents”). A frequent claim is that this movement is necessary to combat the ill effects of 
similarly condoned race matching, such as the 1974 statement by the National Association of Black 
Social Workers against placement of African American children in White homes. BRIGGS, supra 
note 174, at 56–57. This argument overlooks the lack of evidence of any effect of the statement. See 
id. at 57. The highpoint of the first wave of transracial adoptions was in 1970, at 1743 adoptions. 
Id. By the time the Association issued its statement four years later, the number had already dropped 
to 591. Id. 
 186. See Mary Eschelbach Hansen & Daniel Pollack, Transracial Adoption of Black Children: 
An Economic Analysis, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE NEW POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES 
133, 134 (Michele Bratcher Goodwin ed., 2010). The Interethnic Placement Provisions, amending 
the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act, prohibited race matching in public adoptions in 1996. See 
Interethnic Placement Provisions, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1808(c)(1), 110 Stat. 1903 (1996) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(1) (2012)); see also Joan Heifetz Hollinger, ABA Ctr. on Children 
& the Law, A Guide to the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, AM. BAR ASS’N 1, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/child_law/GuidetoMultiethnicPlace 
mentAct.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). Since then, there have been two cases in 
which public agencies were found to block white families from adopting black children 
(interestingly, one was in South Carolina), and some other cases in which public agencies were 
asked to change procedures. See Hansen & Pollack, supra, at 142–43. 
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today as a function of private adopters and the market.187 Seeking to cater 
to the preferences of private adopters, agency websites advertise racial 
segmentation, charging thousands less for less racially desirable babies.188 
In this blatantly racially segmented market, however, the children that 
suffer are those of African American descent; Latino, Asian, and American 
Indian children are generally classified with the vanishingly small supply 
of white infants.189 A recent empirical analysis of applications to adopt 
available infants, for example, found that parents are seven times less 
likely to seek African American infants, but there were no differences 
between rates of application for White and Hispanic babies.190  
In short, the demand for babies like Veronica is such that procedural 
hurdles will not deter prospective adoptive families. As evidence of this, 
ICWA was enacted in 1978;191 since then, multiple high-profile cases have 
overturned adoptive placements that failed to comply with its mandates.192 
Yet the demand for babies is great enough that individuals like the 
Capobiancos wait for months if not years and spend upwards of $40,000 to 
adopt children with Indian heritage and pay little attention to the potential 
implications of the law.193  
But what about children involuntarily removed from their families? 
Won’t ICWA’s procedural protections and placement preferences prevent 
necessary terminations of parental rights and decrease the likelihood of 
Indian children finding permanent placements? In 2005, the Government 
Accountability Office evaluated this concern and determined it was 
                                                                                                                     
 187. See, e.g., PAMELA ANN QUIROZ, ADOPTION IN A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 50 (2007) (“By 
law race cannot be factored into placement; yet in private adoption children are categorized, 
labeled, described, and priced along racial lines. The obviously race-conscious practice of private 
agencies contradicts this color-blind policy, and on websites of private agencies, private identifiers 
such as race become public code. . . . Apparently, race matching and race consciousness are only 
allowed in the ‘free’ market of adoption.”). 
 188. See id. at 68–70, 77. 
 189. Id. at 72–73, 76. 
 190. Baccara et al., supra note 20, at abstract, 3. Girls, like Veronica, are also generally 
preferred over boys. See id. at 23. 
 191. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, NAT’L INDIAN WELFARE ASS’N, 
http://www.nicwa.org/indian_child_welfare_act/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
 192. See, e.g., Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 53–54 (1989) 
(invalidating a three-year placement of twins made in violation of ICWA); In re Adoption of 
Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 963–65, 970 (Utah 1986) (invalidating a five-year placement of a boy 
made in violation of ICWA). 
 193. Melanie Duncan initially estimated in her testimony that they had spent $30,000 to 
$40,000 for the adoption before the litigation arose but later said that those figures were probably 
too low. Testimony of Adoptive Mother, supra note 53, at 198–99. She also testified that she was 
aware in entering the process that Veronica had Cherokee heritage, and knew that it might create 
risks, but considered this just one of the risks present in all adoptions. Id. at 181, 215–16. 
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unfounded.194 Children subject to ICWA did not remain without permanent 
placements longer or experience more changes in placements than other 
children in foster care.195  
Indeed, even the idea that adoption is a significant option for such 
children is inconsistent with the realities of foster care. Fifteen years after 
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 put financial pressure on 
states to terminate parental rights and place more children for adoption,196 
about 20% of foster children, and only about 50% of children placed in 
foster homes with the intent that they be adopted, actually exit foster care 
via adoption.197 Foster children are older and less desirable adoptees than 
children relinquished at birth, and all but 15% of the adopters of such 
children had been their foster parents prior to adoption.198 Additionally, as 
many as 25% of the adopters, accounting for much of the increase in 
adoptions from foster care since 1997, were related to the child.199  
Given the importance of adoption by relatives for children in foster 
care, involving fathers and their families may actually increase the 
possibilities for permanent placement.200 Similarly, ICWA may also 
increase potential permanent placements by enlisting tribes in recruiting 
foster and adoptive families for children, particularly the kind of hard-to-
place older children that are more likely to be in foster care.201  
The child welfare organizations’ amicus brief underscored the 
consistency between children’s interests, ICWA, and its application in 
cases like Adoptive Child.202 Eighteen of the leading child welfare 
organizations in the country joined the brief.203 They included Casey 
Family Programs, the largest foundation focused on foster care and the 
child welfare system; the Child Welfare League of America, whose 
                                                                                                                     
 194.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–05–290, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT: 
EXISTING INFORMATION ON IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES COULD BE USED TO TARGET GUIDANCE AND 
ASSISTANCE TO STATES 4 (Apr. 2005), http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/245936.pdf. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See Frontline, Overview: The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fostercare/inside/asfa.html (last visited Jan. 12, 
2015). 
 197. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION (FFY 2002–FFY 2012), 
ADMIN. FOR CHILD. YOUTH & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 3 (2013), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/trends_fostercare_adoption2012.pdf. 
 198. See Moriguchi, supra note 180, at 18–19, tbl 4. 
 199. Id. at 19. 
 200. Cf. Brief of Casey Family Programs et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent Birth 
Father at 2–3, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12–399). 
 201. For example, in Adoptive Couple, the Cherokee Nation had identified several approved 
Cherokee families who would be interested in adopting Baby Girl if her family did not want 
custody. Brief for the Cherokee Nation at 21–22, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399). 
 202. Brief of Casey Family Programs et al., supra note 200, at 2–3. 
 203. Id. at 1–2. 
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members include five hundred public and private child welfare 
organizations from across the country; the North American Council on 
Adoptable Children, founded by adoptive families to meet the needs of 
children waiting for permanent families and those seeking to adopt them; 
Voice for Adoption, which advocates for improved adoption policies and 
supports adoptive families; the Foster Care Alumni of America, a national 
organization of alumni of the foster care system; FosterClub, a national 
network of children and teens in foster care; and the National Association 
of Social Workers, which represents 140,000 social workers from all fifty 
states.204  
The amici agreed that “legitimate, regularized adoptions are an 
extremely important part of the child welfare system.”205 Nevertheless, 
they were also “unanimous that it is a best practice to preserve a child’s 
ties with her fit, willing birth parents even if those ties are initially 
undeveloped due to separation of the child from the parents shortly after 
birth, as may happen with an adoption placement made at birth,”206 calling 
this a “bedrock principle of child welfare.”207 In particular, the 
organizations argued that fully involving birth fathers regardless of 
whether they had been previously involved with the child was important 
both to ensure stable permanent placements and to allow children to build 
relationships important for their well-being.208 
The organizations were also vehement in their insistence that ties 
formed in placements before legal approval should not be used to justify 
termination of parental rights. “It would turn child welfare best practices 
upside down,” they opined, “if temporary foster care or contested non-final 
adoptive placements, however erroneous, could justify courts’ disregard of 
governing legislative rules providing substantive and procedural safeguards 
for preserving a child’s ties to her fit and willing birth parents.”209 They 
called the “acknowledged heartbreak” of the removal of Veronica from the 
Capobiancos “a case in point” and “the consequence of the petitioners’ 
adoption agency’s circumvention of governing Oklahoma and federal law 
and the failure to adhere to best practices which amici have long 
advocated—not an improper delay in the biological father’s expression of 
his interest.”210 
                                                                                                                     
 204. Id. apps. 1a, 3a, 7a, 9a; Become a Member, CWLA, http://www.cwla.org/membership/ 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
 205. Brief of Casey Family Programs et al., supra note 200, at 27. 
 206. Id. at 9–10. 
 207. Id. at 3. 
 208. See id. at 8–10. 
 209. Id. at 18. 
 210. Id. at 19. 
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The amicus brief submitted by eighteen states, including California, 
New York, and most of the states with the highest Indian populations in the 
United States, agreed that according full rights to birth fathers under ICWA 
supported the interests of children and stable adoption.211 Because states 
have different standards regarding the rights of unmarried birth fathers in 
adoption,212 whether an adoption without paternal consent was legal might 
depend on which state’s law applied. Which state’s law applied, in turn, 
could depend on the residence of the mother, father, or adoptive parent, the 
child’s place of birth and current residence, and where the adoption dispute 
was filed. This variation could lead to confusion, disruptive challenges to 
placement, and “an adoption brokerage business” to game which state’s 
law would apply.213 It would also undermine states’ interests “in ensuring 
that their children’s and adoptive parents’ rights are protected regardless of 
where a child is born, where the father resides, or where the adoption 
ultimately takes place.”214 
In conclusion, the organizations most deeply concerned and involved 
with the rights of children in foster care and adoption—the largest child 
welfare organizations dedicated to their needs and the states empowered to 
protect them—agreed that both in Veronica’s case and in general, ICWA’s 
protections served the best interests of children. The Court based its 
suggestion that they did not—that indeed, they raised equal protection 
concerns215—on untested intuitions rather than fact or expert opinion. The 
next Part shows how these intuitions emerged from distinctions of race, 
gender, and class that are damaging to fathers, mothers, and ultimately to 
children as well.  
III.  3/256THS: DISTORTIONS OF RACE IN THE NAME OF EQUALITY 
Paul Clement’s216 mantra in arguing Adoptive Couple was that ICWA 
only applied because Veronica had “3/256ths of Cherokee blood.” 
Unfortunately for Brown, this became the mantra of the Supreme Court 
majority as well. This assertion was false on several levels and reveals the 
distorted way in which assertions of racial egalitarianism are used to justify 
colonial domination of Native peoples.  
                                                                                                                     
 211. Brief of the States, supra note 25, at 4, 25; see also TINA NORRIS, PAULA L. VINES & 
ELIZABETH M. HOEFFEL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 6 (2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/”cen2010/
briefs/c2010br-10.pdf. 
 212. See Brief of the States, supra note 25, at 23–25; see also generally The Rights of 
Unmarried Fathers, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, (Jan. 2014), https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/
laws_policies/statutes/putative.pdf (summarizing and reprinting varied state laws). 
 213. Brief of the States, supra note 25, at 25 (quoting Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. 
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 46 n.20 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013). 
 216. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.  
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A.  The Making of a Meme 
 Petitioners seem to have hit on the winning theme almost by accident. 
Veronica’s blood quantum was not raised in the proceedings below and 
only appeared in the record through the letter to the Cherokee Nation 
stating that Brown was “1/8 Cherokee, supposedly enrolled.”217 In their 
reply brief arguing for a writ of certiorari, Petitioners stated in a footnote 
that “Baby Girl is 1/2 Hispanic and 1/16 Cherokee.”218 (This conflation of 
Hispanic heritage with a particular racial makeup is questionable as well—
Latin Americans may be White, Black, Asian, or American Indian, and are 
frequently some combination of these—but it is consistent with the efforts 
of Petitioners and their allies to reduce ethnic and cultural identity to 
biology.) In their first brief on the merits, Petitioners stated, again in a 
footnote, “[w]e have since reviewed records from Baby Girl’s paternal 
grandparents reflecting that Baby [G]irl is 3/256 Cherokee.”219  
It was left for Clement, on behalf of the Guardian ad Litem, to turn this 
assertion into a battle cry. He began his brief with the claim that “Baby 
Girl’s sole link to any tribe is her 3/256ths of Cherokee blood. The central 
question in this case is whether that is enough to work a Copernican shift 
in the relationship between the parties.”220 He repeated the 3/256ths 
assertion five more times in his brief.221 He also repeated the statement in 
his argument before the Court222 and was in such a haste to repeat it again 
before closing that he stumbled and had to substitute the easier to say “1 
percent.”223  
By the time Clement sat down, the seed had taken root. When Charles 
Rothfeld224 stood up to argue for Respondents, the Justices took up the 
refrain.225 Chief Justice Roberts asked him 
is there at all a threshold before you can call, under the 
statute, a child an ‘Indian child’? 3/256ths? And what if the 
tribe—what if you had a tribe with a zero percent blood 
                                                                                                                     
 217. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 554 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2552 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 218. See Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 129, at 5 n.1. 
 219. See Brief for Petitioners, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12–399), 2013 WL 
633597, at *6 n.1. 
 220. Reply Brief for Guardian ad Litem, ex rel. Baby Girl, Supporting Reversal at 1, Adoptive 
Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12–399). 
 221. Id. at 2, 8, 16, 20–21. 
 222. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12–399) (“[I]t 
happened because of 3/256ths of Cherokee blood.”). 
 223. See id. at 29. 
 224. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 225. Students who have been told to have a “theme of the case” and work their legal arguments 
into it should take note: It works! 
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requirement; they’re open for, you know, people who want to 
apply, who think culturally they’re a Cherokee or—or any 
number of fundamentally accepted conversions.226  
He returned to this theme later, stating, “I’m just wondering is 3/256ths 
close—close to zero? I mean, that’s—that’s the question in terms to me, 
that if you have a definition, is it one drop of blood that triggers all these 
extraordinary rights?”227 After  Rothfeld sought to establish that Cherokee 
citizenship relies not on blood quantum but lineal descent, Justice Alito 
introduced a variation on the theme, asking: “But what if a tribe makes 
eligibility available for anybody who, as a result of a DNA test, can 
establish any Indian ancestry, no matter how slight?”228 Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor finally intervened, giving Rothfeld the opportunity to turn the 
final minutes of his argument back to statutory interpretation.229  
Focusing on the portion of the oral argument dealing with statutory 
interpretation, one might predict a win for Respondents. The Justices 
generally poked holes in Petitioners’ statutory arguments, but not the 
Respondents’. On reading the opinion, however, one realizes that the 
3/256ths meme was more important than the statutory text. Justice Alito 
began his opinion for the majority with this sentence: “This case is about a 
little girl (Baby Girl) who is classified as an Indian because she is 1.2% 
(3/256) Cherokee.”230 After reciting the facts and procedural history, the 
Court repeated the phrase: “It is undisputed that, had Baby Girl not been 
3/256 Cherokee, Biological Father would have had no right to object to her 
adoption under South Carolina law.”231 One did not need to read the 
statutory analysis to know that Petitioners would win.  
B.  Disputing the “Undisputed” 
In reality, blood quantum had nothing to do with ICWA’s application to 
Veronica, and her actual blood quantum is probably not 3/256ths 
Cherokee. ICWA does not require any fraction of Indian blood. Rather, it 
states that an “Indian child” is “any unmarried person who is under age 
eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for 
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an 
Indian tribe.”232 This definition is predominantly political. While children 
who are not yet enrolled in an Indian tribe must be biological children of 
                                                                                                                     
 226. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 222, at 38–39, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 
(No. 12–399). 
 227. Id. at 42. 
 228. Id. at 42–43. 
 229. See id. at 43–51. 
 230. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556. 
 231. Id. at 2559. 
 232. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012). 
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members of the tribe, it is membership or eligibility for membership in an 
Indian tribe that defines Indian status.233 Indeed, the South Dakota 
Supreme Court has held that a child without Indian heritage who had been 
adopted by a Lakota family and had become a member of their tribe is an 
“Indian child” for purposes of the act.234  
Veronica was an Indian child under ICWA because her father was a 
citizen of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma and she was eligible for 
Cherokee citizenship. Her eligibility did not depend on blood quantum. 
Like a significant plurality of tribes,235 the Cherokee Nation does not 
require any particular degree of heritage, but instead requires establishing 
one lineal ancestor from particular historical census rolls.236 For the 
Cherokee Nation, this means proof of descent from the Dawes Rolls, 
census rolls created by the federal government between 1899 and 1906 in 
preparation for “allotment,” the division and sale of Cherokee, Choctaw, 
Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole land.237   
Although the rolls ostensibly record blood quantum, these “blood” 
determinations are well known to be inaccurate. Despite frequent 
intermarriage, the rolls did not include heritage from tribes other than the 
tribe at issue;238 and for many with some African heritage, they failed to 
include any Cherokee heritage at all.239 Additionally, some traditional 
Cherokee citizens refused to enroll at all, resisting the destruction of the 
tribe the Dawes Rolls sought to facilitate.240 Those who did enroll had 
incentives to misrepresent their blood quantum to avoid the federal 
property restrictions imposed on those of Cherokee blood.241 Therefore, 
                                                                                                                     
 233. See id. § 1903(4)(b). 
 234. In re Dependency & Neglect of A.L., 442 N.W.2d 233, 235 (S.D. 1989). 
 235. Kirsty Gover, Genealogy as Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for 
Descent Rules in Membership Governance in the United States, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 243, 271 
(2008) (noting that 44% of tribal constitutions reviewed in a comprehensive study followed a lineal 
descent rule). 
 236. See Citizenship, CHEROKEE NATION, http://www.cherokee.org/Services/TribalCitizenship/
Citizenship.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2015); see also Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood 
Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935, 51 S.D. L. REV. 1, 48 (2006) (discussing blood quantum 
and lineal descent in regard to Indian tribal membership). 
 237. Id. at 30, 40–41. 
 238. ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES 
47 (1973); see also, e.g., Cully v. Mitchell, 37 F.2d 493, 494 (10th Cir. 1930). 
 239. Spruhan, supra note 236, at 41. 
 240. DEBO, supra note 238, at 37. Allotment was imposed despite steadfast Cherokee 
objection, id. at 32–33, and would ultimately result in most of the Cherokee Nation being sold to 
non-Indians. After completion, moreover, Cherokee Nation courts would be dissolved and 
Cherokee Nation laws would no longer be recognized. Act of June 29, 1898, ch. 517, § 28, 30 Stat. 
495, 504–05. 
 241. After 1904, only allottees without Indian blood could alienate their lands, see REPORT OF 
THE U.S. INDIAN INSPECTOR FOR THE INDIAN TERRITORY 30 (1905), while after 1906, only allottees 
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many, like Brown, who Maldonado believed to have one-eighth Cherokee 
descent, report more heritage than can be proven from the Dawes Rolls, 
while others, like Maldonado, report Cherokee heritage not reflected on the 
rolls at all, and there is reason to believe some of these reports are 
accurate.242   
 In short, when the majority confidently declared that “[i]t is undisputed 
that, had Baby Girl not been 3/256 Cherokee, Biological Father would 
have had no right to object to her adoption under South Carolina law,”243 it 
was wrong on three counts. First, Veronica likely had more Cherokee 
heritage from her father than is reflected in the Dawes Rolls and, if her 
mother’s testimony is credible, some Cherokee heritage from her mother as 
well.244 Second, Veronica’s quantum of Cherokee blood was irrelevant to 
her citizenship in the Cherokee Nation. Therefore, third, under federal law, 
Veronica’s “Cherokee blood” was not the reason her father had rights to 
object to her adoption. 
C.  Settler Colonialism for a Modern Era 
The factual and legal inaccuracies in the 3/256ths meme are, of course, 
not the central problem. The central problem is why the claim, whatever its 
merit, was so compelling to the Justices. The easy answer is that racial 
classifications are inconsistent with American ideology, or at least with the 
ideology of color-blindness. The Justices’ focus on the alleged small 
degree of heritage casts the lie on this answer. If the Justices really 
objected to classification by race, they should not have objected to 
applying ICWA to a child like Veronica, who was not obviously racially 
Indian. This objection was not a product of America’s relatively recent 
                                                                                                                     
with less than full Indian blood could do so, Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, § 20, 34 Stat. 145 
(1906). 
 242. See Dan Littlefield, Study of Historical Facts Clarifies Freedman Citizenship Issue, 
CHEROKEE PHOENIX, available at http://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Article/Index/1760 (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2015) (“Cherokee family stories commonly tell how an ancestor on the Dawes roll is listed 
as half blood when he or she was really full. Most of those stories are probably true. Knowing that 
they would likely be labeled incompetent, many Cherokees probably chose voluntarily to lower 
their blood quantum.”); see also, e.g., Stephen Herrington, Elizabeth Warren: Record of American 
Indian Heritage Was Destroyed in 1906, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2012, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-herrington/re-elizabeth-warren-ameri_b_1535095.html 
(discussing the Choctaw author’s family’s story). Because Congress decreed that the blood quantum 
determinations on the Dawes Rolls are conclusive, however, courts have repeatedly held that these 
determinations cannot be amended, even if determinations regarding an enrollee’s other family 
members establish the inaccuracy of the records. See, e.g., Cully, 37 F.2d at 494–95, 499 (refusing 
to change legal determination that daughter had one-quarter Indian blood based on rolls records, 
although her mother was recorded as being one-half Seminole, and her father as being full Creek). 
 243. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2559 (2013). 
 244.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text (quoting the letter from the birth mother’s 
attorney to the Cherokee Nation stating the birth mother’s belief that she is part Cherokee). 
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rejection of racial classifications, but instead of a much older ideology: the 
expectation and insistence on the absorption and disappearance of 
indigenous peoples.  
One could see Adoptive Couple as part of the campaign to enforce 
color-blindness as an equality principle, and some of the Justices certainly 
did. This was, after all, the term in which the Supreme Court both 
invalidated the preclearance portions of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby 
County v. Holder245 and narrowed the eye of the needle that universities 
must thread to consider race in admissions in Fisher v. University of Texas 
at Austin.246 Chief Justice John Roberts, at least, has shown some 
confusion about the difference between Native sovereignty and affirmative 
action, arguing in his confirmation hearings that his representation of the 
State of Hawaii in Rice v. Cayetano247—a case regarding voting for the 
trustees of Native Hawaiian trust land248—was an argument in favor of 
affirmative action.249 But classifying Indians in this way confuses the 
different racial logic applied to African Americans and Indians. The 
discussion of race in the Adoptive Couple oral argument shows that the 
Justices were not primarily concerned about special rights for Indians, but 
instead about ensuring that those rights remained limited to a small and 
racially defined group.  
The dominant understanding of the role of race in America emerges 
from the history of slavery and the control of African American and later 
immigrant laborers. The colonial domination of indigenous peoples, in 
contrast, was founded in the desire to establish control over the land and 
ideological superiority over the nation.250 This generates stark differences 
in the regulation of boundaries between the dominated and dominating 
peoples. While the boundaries between African Americans and Whites, for 
example, were rigidly maintained, the boundaries between Indians and 
Whites were deliberately porous, and intermarriage resulting in 
assimilation into the colonizing group was often encouraged.251 As 
Professor Patrick Wolfe wrote in his foundational work on settler 
colonialism in Australia, although “the one-drop rule has meant that the 
category ‘black’ can withstand unlimited admixture, the category ‘red’ has 
                                                                                                                     
 245. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
 246. 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013). 
 247. 528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
 248. Id. at 510–11. 
 249. See N. BRUCE DUTHU, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 142 (2008). 
 250. See Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591, 
593–94 (2009) [hereinafter Berger, Red]; VINE DELORIA JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN 
INDIAN MANIFESTO 173–74 (1988). 
 251. Berger, Red, supra note 250, at 594–95, 626, 633–44. 
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been highly vulnerable to dilution.”252 The result was to increase 
commodified black labor, “so that white plantation owners father black 
children,” but “white fathers generated so-called ‘half-breeds’ whose 
indigeneity was compromised.”253 
Although Wolfe wrote primarily about Australia, racial mixing has 
been advocated as a means to end Indian-ness throughout U.S. history. 
Pocahontas was celebrated as an example of successful conversion and 
civilization of an Indian princess by intermarriage.254 In the same year that 
Thomas Jefferson proposed forcible removal of Indian tribes beyond the 
Mississippi, he also advised the Delawares to “mix with us by marriage, 
your blood will run in our veins, and will spread over this great island.”255 
Later, at the height of Jim Crow, in 1888 Congress enacted a statute 
providing citizenship to Indian women who married white men to 
encourage assimilation.256 American-Indian scholar Vine Deloria Jr. wrote 
that when he worked in Washington, D.C. with the National Congress of 
American Indians, “it was a rare day when some white didn’t visit [his] 
office and proudly proclaim that he or she was of Indian descent.”257 The 
claimants often intend by these claims to assert sympathy with Indians and 
defend against claims of racism. For Indians fighting for the existence of 
their tribes, however, these claims are only a reminder of the successful 
destruction of tribal identity. 
The distinct racial and cultural ethos of settler colonialism has 
important implications for adoption of Indian children and perceptions of 
Indian race. Incorporation of Indians into white families has been part of 
American policy from the celebrated kidnapping and marriage of 
Pocahontas by the Virginia Company258 to the partnership between the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs with the Child Welfare League of America to 
move Indian children to homes far from the reservation in the 1950s and 
1960s.259 Although the federal program itself did not cover many children, 
                                                                                                                     
 252. PATRICK WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ANTHROPOLOGY: 
THE POLITICS AND POETICS OF AN ETHNOGRAPHIC EVENT 1–2 (1999) (footnote omitted). 
 253. Id. at 2. 
 254. See Bethany Ruth Berger, After Pocahontas: Indian Women and the Law, 1830 to 1934, 
21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) [hereinafter Berger, After Pocahontas]. 
 255. Berger, Red, supra note 250, at 627. 
 256. See Act of Aug. 9, 1888, ch. 818, § 2, 25 Stat. 392, 392 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. § 182 (1888)). 
 257. DELORIA, supra note 250, at 2–3. Deloria also noted that these claimed ancestors were 
always women. Id. at 3. 
 258. See RALPH HAMOR, A TRUE DISCOURSE OF THE PRESENT STATE OF VIRGINIA 4–11 (Va. 
State Library 1957) (1615). 
 259. See DAVID FANSHEL, FAR FROM THE RESERVATION: THE TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION OF INDIAN 
CHILDREN, at ix (1972); 2 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 1153–54 (1984). 
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it represented a widely held idea that Indian children were better off away 
from their birth families. In the legislative report on the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, for example, Congress found that one in four Indian children 
under age one in Minnesota were adopted and that, in Washington, Indian 
children were nineteen times more likely to be adopted than other 
children.260  
There is no credible argument that the Capobiancos actively tried to 
take Veronica away from an Indian environment—all the reliable evidence 
suggests that they simply wanted a child to love. Nevertheless, adoption of 
Indian children into non-Indian homes has a particularly honored and 
accepted place in American culture. Further, the notion of easy and 
beneficial assimilation of Indian children into white culture helps fuel the 
desirability of Indian children as adoptees.  
More importantly, the simultaneous fragility and romanticization of 
Indian status posed a significant challenge to the claim that Veronica could 
be considered Indian or Cherokee. The possibility that a child could remain 
politically Indian after generations of intermarriage undermined the 
assumption that Indian tribes would eventually disappear. The questions of 
Justices Roberts and Alito reflect this concern: would recognizing 
Veronica as Cherokee mean that tribes could be “open for, you know, 
people who want to apply, who think culturally they’re a Cherokee or—or 
any number of fundamentally accepted conversions,”261 or “anybody who, 
as a result of a DNA test, can establish any Indian ancestry, no matter how 
slight?”262 At the same time, the idea that Dusten Brown—phenotypically 
White and a soldier in the U.S. Army—was in fact Indian undermined 
romantic notions of Indians as isolated sources of mysticism and a spiritual 
connection to the natural world.  
The Supreme Court’s focus on biological race, moreover, led it to 
ignore the evidence that the Browns were traditionally Indian in all other 
senses of the word. First, as enrolled citizens, Brown and his family were 
politically part of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma; Brown’s father even 
voted in Cherokee elections.263 Second, they were geographically part of 
the Cherokee Nation. Although Justice Thomas’s opinion asserted that the 
Browns did not live on a reservation,264 the Cherokee Nation no longer has 
a formal reservation.265 What it does have is a fourteen-county 
                                                                                                                     
 260. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978). 
 261. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 222, at 38–39 (quoting Roberts, C.J.). 
 262. Id. at 43 (quoting Alito, J.). 
 263. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 566 n.28 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 
2552 (2013). 
 264. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2570 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 265. See Frequently Asked Questions, CHEROKEE NATION, http://www.cherokee.org/
AboutTheNation/FrequentlyAskedQuestions.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2015) (“Where is the 
Cherokee Nation? The Cherokee Nation is not a reservation; it is a 7,000 square mile jurisdictional 
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jurisdictional area in Northeastern Oklahoma, and Notawa and Bartlesville, 
where Brown, his parents, and Maldonado live, are part of it.266 Although 
Brown lived on a military base when the case arose, the Cherokee Nation 
was where Brown grew up and called home, and where he returned after 
his tour in Iraq.267  
Finally, the Supreme Court ignored the evidence that Brown was very 
much culturally Cherokee as well. His family owned Indian trust land in 
Pryor and Cayuga, Oklahoma, had traditional ties with their extended 
relatives, and were proud of their membership in the Wolf Clan.268 They 
regularly prepared traditional foods such as “grape dumplings, buckskin 
bread, Indian cornbread, Indian tacos, wild onions, fry bread, polk salad 
and deer meat,” and attended Cherokee holidays in Tahlequah, 
Oklahoma—the Cherokee Nation’s capitol.269 The family court found that 
Brown was a “Cherokee in more than name only” and that his “heritage 
and culture are very important to him and always ha[ve] been.”270 
By every measure except race, the Browns were a Cherokee family 
living in a Cherokee community. In the name of racial equality, however, 
the Supreme Court constrained the application of ICWA, in part, because 
the Browns just were not racially Indian enough. This was not a 
manifestation of egalitarianism, but rather of something much older: the 
belief that the dilution of Indian blood should end Indian tribes and the 
Indian problem once and for all. 
D.  Equal Protection Evasions 
But doesn’t the role of Indian heritage in Cherokee enrollment, and 
therefore in ICWA, render it suspect under the equal protection 
implications of the Fifth Amendment? No. Both ICWA and its application 
to this case are consistent with the original understanding of the Equal 
Protection Clause, decades of unquestioned Supreme Court opinions, and 
state court consensus in ICWA cases with facts like these.  
As I have discussed elsewhere, the drafters of the Fourteenth 
Amendment understood that protecting the sovereignty and separate rights 
of Native peoples was as much a matter of equality as preventing state 
                                                                                                                     
area covering all of eight counties and portions of six additional counties in Northeastern 
Oklahoma.”). 
 266. See Cherokee Nation Jurisdiction, CHEROKEE NATION, http://www.cherokee.org/Portals/0/
Documents/2013/01/33080Cherokee_Nation_Jurisdiction.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2015); Adoptive 
Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 553. 
 267. See id. at 553, 555 & n.11. 
 268. Id. at 565 n.28. 
 269. Id. (quoting the family court); see also National Holiday, CHEROKEE NATION, 
http://www.cherokee.org/AboutTheNation/NationalHoliday.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
 270. Brief in Opposition, supra note 30, at *9 (quoting the family court). 
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discrimination against African Americans.271 More importantly, as the 
Supreme Court first began to confront questions of reverse discrimination 
under the Equal Protection Clause, it decided in Morton v. Mancari272 that 
federal measures providing different treatment to Native people are 
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment so long as they “can be tied 
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’s unique obligation toward the 
Indians.”273 There, the Court upheld an employment preference for Indians 
in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), reasoning that given the unique 
degree of control the BIA held over Indians lives, such a measure was 
rationally related to the goal of increasing tribal self-governance.274 The 
Court further reasoned that because the application of the preference 
required membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe, the measure 
was “political rather than racial in nature.”275 
Since then, the Supreme Court has relied upon Mancari to uphold a 
number of different federal programs treating Indians differently, as well as 
state actions implementing federal obligations.276 One of these cases, 
Fisher v. District Court,277 was a precursor to ICWA. In Fisher, the Court 
held that tribal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over an adoption dispute 
between tribal members and that such exclusive jurisdiction was not 
impermissible racial discrimination but, rather, a necessary result of 
retained self-government of the tribe.278 Most recently, in 2000, Rice v. 
Cayetano279 struck down a state scheme giving Native Hawaiians special 
voting rights in state elections,280 but reaffirmed the validity of Mancari 
and its progeny, stating: “Of course, as we have established in a series of 
cases, Congress may fulfill its treaty obligations and its responsibilities to 
the Indian tribes by enacting legislation dedicated to their circumstances 
                                                                                                                     
 271. See Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law, 98 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1165, 1172–79 (2010) [hereinafter Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal 
Indian Law]. 
 272. 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
 273. Id. at 555. See generally Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law, 
supra note 271, at 1183–86. 
 274. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554. 
 275. Id. at 553 n.24. 
 276. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 
U.S. 463, 500–01, 504 (1979) (discussing civil and criminal jurisdiction); United States v. 
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645–47 (1977) (upholding criminal statutes that based jurisdiction on 
tribal membership); Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84–86 (1977) (discussing 
eligibility for compensation for illegal acquisition of tribal land); Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 
390–91 (1976) (discussing jurisdiction in adoption cases). 
 277. 424 U.S. 382. 
 278. Id. at 390–91. 
 279. 528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
 280. Id. at 499, 524. 
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and needs.”281  
ICWA easily fits within the Mancari precedent. The provisions 
regarding exclusive tribal jurisdiction over Indian children domiciled on a 
reservation largely codify Fisher v. District Court.282 The provisions 
requiring truly voluntary consent to relinquish custody and preventing 
unnecessary involuntary removals of children283 try to ensure that Indian 
communities and tribes do not lose their future generations without 
cause.284 Because, as Congress recognized, “there is no resource that is 
more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than 
their children,”285 these goals are well within “Congress’[s] unique 
obligation toward the Indians.”286 In addition, because ICWA applies only 
to children who are either tribal citizens, or whose parents are tribal 
citizens and who are eligible for citizenship themselves, it accomplishes 
these goals through a classification that rests squarely on “political rather 
than racial” belonging.287  
Therefore, although ICWA has faced several state and lower federal 
court challenges under the equal protection implications of the Fifth 
Amendment, all but one court has rejected such challenges.288 The one 
court to uphold a constitutional challenge is the third division of the 
California appellate courts, which, in a split with the other divisions, found 
that ICWA may be unconstitutional as applied to “children whose 
biological parents do not have a significant social, cultural or political 
                                                                                                                     
 281. Id. at 519. 
 282. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2012). 
 283. See id. §§ 1912–13. 
 284. See id. § 1901(2)–(5) (discussing the congressional findings underlying ICWA). 
 285. Id. § 1901(3). 
 286. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). See generally Berger, Reconciling 
Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law, supra note 271, at 1183–86. 
 287. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24. Although some raised concerns about ICWA’s 
coverage of children who had not themselves formally enrolled in their tribes, Congress determined 
that “[t]he constitutional and plenary power of Congress over Indians and Indian tribes and affairs 
cannot be made to hinge upon the cranking into operation of a mechanical [enrollment] process 
established under tribal law, particularly with respect to Indian children who, because of their 
minority, cannot make a reasoned decision about their tribal and Indian identity.” H.R. REP. No. 95-
1386, at 17 (1978). In contrast, the Iowa Supreme Court has held that a state statute that applied 
ICWA to children who were not eligible for tribal membership was unconstitutional. In re A. W., 
741 N.W.2d 793, 813 (Iowa 2007). 
 288. See, e.g., In re Appeal in Pima Cnty. Juvenile Action, 635 P.2d 187, 193 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1981) (rejecting the challenge); In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1067–68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) 
(same); In re A.B., 663 N.W.2d 625, 636 (N.D. 2003) (same); In re Adoption of Child of Indian 
Heritage, 529 A.2d 1009, 1010 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (noting that the Act has been held 
constitutional), aff’d, 543 A.2d 925 (1988); In re Guardianship of D.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 281 
(S.D. 1980) (rejecting the challenge). 
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relationship with an Indian community.”289 No court, however, has found 
that ICWA is unconstitutional as applied to a child whose biological family 
is so fully socially, culturally, and politically Cherokee as the Browns. The 
Court’s ominous reference to “equal protection concerns,”290 therefore, 
was deliberately vague; to uncover its foundation would reveal that it was 
built upon air.  
IV.  MARGINALIZING MOTHERS 
The decision in Adoptive Couple may appear, at first glance, to be a 
feminist one: a single mother unsupported by the birth father gets exclusive 
rights to make decisions for her child. Further examination, however, 
shows the decision was founded in ideas about parenthood that are 
destructive for women, particularly women of color, and their children. 
This Part shows the links between the rise and fall of the constitutional 
rights of nonmarital fathers and those of nonmarital mothers and children, 
and their relationship to policies reducing support for families headed by 
single women and facilitating adoption of their children.  
A.  The Rise and Fall of Constitutional Rights of  
Unmarried Fathers 
For most of U.S. history, the law sharply divided the rights of parents 
and children in marital and non-marital families. Until well into the 
twentieth century, fathers had substantial—even supreme—rights 
regarding their children by marriage,291 and such children had economic 
and legal rights with respect to those fathers.292 A child of unmarried 
parents, however, was historically considered filius nullius, the child of no 
one,293 and even their mothers were denied many parental rights.294 Even 
after unmarried mothers and children began to be recognized as family 
                                                                                                                     
 289. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 526 (Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see also In re Santos 
Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 718–19, 730–31(Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming the doctrine of In re 
Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507). Commentators have roundly criticized this line of decisions. See 
Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1373, 1380–88 (2002); Lorie M. Graham, 
“The Past Never Vanishes”: A Contextual Critique of the Existing Indian Family Doctrine, 23 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 34–43 (1998). 
 290. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013). 
 291. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the 
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1036–50 (1992). 
 292. Id. at 1037–38. 
 293. Laura Oren, Honor Thy Mother?: The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of Motherhood, 17 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 187, 189 (2006). 
 294. “Neither subsequent marriage of the parents, nor paternity established by 
acknowledgment could ‘legitimate’ an illegitimate child.” Susan E. Satava, Comment, 
Discrimination Against the Unacknowledged Illegitimate Child and the Wrongful Death Statute, 25 
CAP. U. L. REV. 933, 937 (1996). 
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units in the nineteenth century, they were denied many of the legal rights 
attached to the parent-child relationship; unmarried fathers, moreover, had 
no rights or responsibilities at all.295 
These legal rules reflected three concepts deeply linked to the unequal 
status of women: first, pregnancy outside of marriage was a shameful, 
marginalized state; second, only a legal relationship to a man could 
establish full legal personhood; and third, absent such a legal tie, men had 
little emotional or caretaking attachment to their children.296 Families of 
color suffered particularly under these rules, both because of higher rates of 
illegitimacy297 and because of disregard of their attachment to their 
children.298  
Both the stigma of unmarried motherhood and the acceptance of 
paternal domination of the marital family suffered serious setbacks in the 
1960s and 1970s, and courts and legislatures shifted accordingly. Although 
the first challenges came in cases involving motherhood, part of this 
clearly feminist development was the recognition that fathers, whether 
married or not, also had interests in the care and welfare of their children. 
By the 1980s, however, the Court began to reassert the distinctions of 
legitimacy, reducing parental rights of unmarried fathers to facilitate the 
claims of married husbands. 
                                                                                                                     
 295. See Oren, supra note 293, at 189, 191. 
 296. See Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern American 
Infanticide, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 71 (1996) (“[T]here still is considerable shame and guilt 
associated with a teenager’s pregnancy.”); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s 
Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082–84 
(1994) (summarizing in part the inequality of wives before the law); Matthew B. Firing, Note, In 
Whose Best Interests? Courts’ Failure to Apply State Custodial Laws Equally Amongst Spouses 
and Its Constitutional Implications, 20 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 223, 228 (2007) (explaining that 
effective fatherhood from the early 1880s through the early 1900s was measured by the father’s 
ability to earn income, not the emotional bonds he forged with his children). 
 297. See generally Steven Ruggles, The Origins of African-American Family Structure, 59 
AM. SOC. REV. 136, 136, 138 (1990) (noting that, from 1880 to 1990, “black children were two to 
three times more likely to reside without one or both parents than were white children”). 
 298. The boarding school system was the greatest symptom of this notion regarding Native 
people. See, e.g., In re Can-Ah-Couqua, 29 F. 687, 687, 689, 690 (D. Alaska 1887) (rejecting an 
Alaska Native mother’s habeas corpus action for the release of her eight-year-old son after three 
years in boarding school although “the profligate and dissolute life she has lived has not entirely 
extinguished the natural affection and love of a mother’s heart”); see also Berger, After Pocahontas, 
supra note 254, at 44–45 (discussing assumptions that Native women cared little for their children, 
who should be removed for their own good). The brutal system of slavery is the paradigmatic 
example of disrespect for relationships between African American parents and children, although 
suspicion of parents’ unwillingness or inability to raise their own children, and practices of 
separating children from their parents to put them to work continued long after. BRIGGS, supra note 
174, at 49–52; see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 65 
(2002) (discussing denigration and disregard for relationship between Black mothers and their 
children in welfare reform discourse). 
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The Supreme Court first affirmed the constitutional rights of nonmarital 
children and their mothers with a pair of 1968 cases involving Louisiana 
law. Levy v. Louisiana299 invalidated a law preventing nonmarital children 
from suing for the wrongful death of their mother,300 while Glona v. 
American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Co.301 invalidated a law 
preventing nonmarital mothers from suing for the wrongful deaths of their 
children.302 In 1972, the Court affirmed the connection between nonmarital 
fathers and their children by striking down a provision of Louisiana’s 
worker’s compensation scheme that denied death benefits to illegitimate 
children who had lived with the dead worker but whom he had not 
formally acknowledged.303 
Stanley v. Illinois,304 the first case to acknowledge the parental rights 
(as opposed to simply obligations) of unmarried fathers, was decided later 
that year.305 There, in a case in which an unmarried father’s rights in the 
children he had lived with their entire lives were terminated without a 
hearing, the Court held that the interest “of a man in the children he has 
sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful 
countervailing interest, protection.”306 Over the next few years, the Court 
decided several more cases regarding the relationship between nonmarital 
fathers and their children.  
Some of these cases involved the rights of nonmarital children to claim 
support from their fathers. Gomez v. Perez,307 for example, invalidated a 
Texas law providing that only marital children could demand child support 
from their fathers,308 while Trimble v. Gordon309 struck down an Illinois 
law providing that nonmarital children could not be the intestate heirs of 
their fathers.310 Other cases supported the desire of nonmarital fathers to 
                                                                                                                     
 299. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
 300. Id. at 72 (“These children, though illegitimate, were dependent on her; she cared for them 
and nurtured them; they were indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense; in her death 
they suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent would.”). 
 301. 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
 302. Id. at 75. In Glona, the State sought to defend the scheme with its desire to discourage 
illegitimacy. While not stating that the purpose itself was invalid, the Court found it inapplicable 
here: “[W]e see no possible rational basis for assuming that if the natural mother is allowed 
recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause of illegitimacy will be served. It 
would, indeed, be farfetched to assume that women have illegitimate children so that they can be 
compensated in damages for their death.” Id. 
 303. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972). 
 304. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 305.  Id. at 658–59. 
 306. Id. at 651. 
 307. 409 U.S. 535 (1973). 
 308. Id. at 537–38. 
 309. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
 310. Id. at 763, 766. 
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care for their children. Thus, Jimenez v. Weinberger311 allowed fathers to 
claim Social Security disability benefits for nonmarital children born after 
the disability began,312 while Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld313 held that fathers 
were entitled to survivor’s Social Security benefits after the death of their 
wives.314 
In Wiesenfeld, the Social Security Administration sought to restrict 
survivor’s benefits to women on the grounds that the benefits were 
designed to permit the survivor to remain home with the children, but the 
Court found that “[i]t is no less important for a child to be cared for by its 
sole surviving parent when that parent is male rather than female.”315 Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg litigated Wiesenfeld for the Women’s Rights Project of the 
ACLU,316 and the reason why is clear: Breaking down the legal 
presumption that only mothers had an interest in or responsibility for 
childcare was a key goal of the feminist movement.317  
In 1978, on the eve of the passage of ICWA, Quilloin v. Walcott318 held 
that an unwed father who had neither lived with nor made any effort to 
legitimate his child for eleven years after their birth had no constitutional 
right to veto a stepfather’s adoption of the child.319 Quilloin was a rare 
unanimous decision on the rights of unwed fathers, and the opinion 
sensitively recognized both the rights of biological parents and the rights of 
families not formed through biology.  
The Quilloin Court reiterated that “[i]t is cardinal with us that the 
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,”320 and 
declared it “firmly established that ‘freedom of personal choice in matters 
of family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.’”321 But the Court emphasized that “this is not 
a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or sought, actual or legal 
custody of his child,” or one where “adoption would place the child with a 
new set of parents with whom the child had never before lived. Rather, the 
                                                                                                                     
 311. 417 U.S. 628 (1974). 
 312.  Id. at 634–35. 
 313. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
 314. Id. at 651. During this time period, the court also summarily affirmed lower court 
decisions striking down legislative distinctions between marital and nonmarital children. See, e.g., 
Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588, 589 (Dist. Ct. Conn.), aff’d, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Griffin 
v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 (Dist. Ct. Md.), aff’d, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). 
 315. 420 U.S. at 651–52. 
 316.  Id. at 637. 
 317. For an example of this theme in feminist writing, see BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: 
FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 138 (2d ed. 2000). 
 318. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
 319. Id. at 256. 
 320. Id. at 255 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 321. Id. (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974)). 
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result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit 
already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except appellant.”322 
In this situation, the Court found that the state did not need to establish that 
the biological father was an unfit parent, but simply that the adoption was 
“in the best interests of the child.”323  
The next year, the Court illustrated the narrowness of the Quilloin 
holding. Caban v. Mohammed324 held that it was unconstitutional to deny 
an unmarried father—whose name was on his children’s birth certificates 
and who had lived with the children until his separation from their 
mother—the right to block their adoption by the mother’s new husband.325 
The appellees in that case argued that the “closer relationship” a mother 
bore to her children justified requiring the consent of unwed mothers, but 
not fathers, before adoptions.326 The New York Court of Appeals upheld 
the challenged distinction on the ground that requiring paternal consent 
“would have the overall effect of denying homes to the homeless and of 
depriving innocent children of the other blessings of adoption. The cruel 
and undeserved out-of-wedlock stigma would continue its visitations.”327 
The Supreme Court rejected both justifications. First, “[m]aternal and 
paternal roles are not invariably different in importance. . . . [A]n unwed 
father may have a relationship with his children fully comparable to that of 
the mother.”328 Second, although “some unwed fathers would prevent the 
adoption of their illegitimate children, . . . [t]his impediment to adoption 
usually is the result of a natural parental interest shared by both genders 
alike.”329 
The Court soon shifted from its earlier rejection of distinctions based on 
illegitimacy, upholding exclusion of unmarried mothers from survivor’s 
benefits after the death of the father of their children,330 as well as different 
technical state requirements before nonmarital children could have a legal 
relationship to their parents.331 The parental rights of unmarried fathers 
suffered a similar blow. In 1983, Lehr v. Robertson332 held that an 
                                                                                                                     
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 324. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 325. Id. at 394. 
 326. Id. at 388 (quoting oral argument). 
 327. In re Malpica-Orsini, 331 N.E.2d 486, 489 (N.Y. 1975). 
 328. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389. 
 329. Id. at 391–92. 
 330. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 296 (1979). 
 331. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 261–63, 264 (1978) (upholding a state law 
requiring paternity to have been established by judicial decree during the life of the decedent to 
establish intestate succession, in a case in which the father had acknowledged his children by 
affidavit and provided them with child support during their lives). 
 332. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
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unmarried father was not entitled to notice or the right to prevent adoption 
of his child by her stepfather where he had neither lived with her, 
financially supported her, nor added his name to New York’s putative 
father registry.333 
The Lehr case might seem similar to Quilloin, but Lehr had lived with 
the mother (who struggled with mental illness) before the birth and visited 
her in the hospital until she left with their daughter, Jessica, without telling 
him where she was going.334 During the next two years, Lehr repeatedly 
searched for Jessica, occasionally finding and visiting her before her 
mother would move again.335 Then, after he had been unable to find Jessica 
for a year, Lehr finally located Jessica with the aid of a detective agency 
after her mother had married.336 Before Lehr learned of the adoption 
petition, he filed to establish paternity and visitation, and the judge in the 
adoption case knew this.337 Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court found 
that Lehr was not entitled to notice of the petition for adoption by Jessica’s 
stepfather (much less the right to object to it) because he could have 
established his rights by filing with the putative father registry—a registry 
of which neither he nor the vast majority of unmarried fathers were 
aware.338 Where previous cases could be read to distinguish between 
willing and reluctant fathers, Lehr seemed to permit states to deny rights to 
even willing fathers who had been thwarted in their desire to parent their 
children.  
Despite the links between condemnation of illegitimacy and 
condemnation of women’s sexual freedom, rules like those encouraged by 
Lehr may still seem to forward women’s interests. Why shouldn’t women 
facing the prospect of raising their children on their own have sole rights to 
determine how their children are raised and by whom? The context of these 
cases undermines this feminist gloss. Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr all 
supported states in transferring legal bonds to children from unmarried 
fathers to married husbands. They do not support women’s freedom to 
raise their children themselves, but rather their choice to legitimate them 
through stepparent adoption. Stepparent adoptions comprise a large 
                                                                                                                     
 333. Id. at 267–68, 274. 
 334. Id. at 268–69 (White, J., dissenting). Because the family court denied Lehr an opportunity 
to be heard in the adoption case, Lehr was not permitted to establish these facts at trial. Id. at 271. 
 335. Id. at 269. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. at 252 (majority opinion); id. at 275 (White, J., dissenting). 
 338. See id. at 264 (majority opinion) (declaring that the father’s ignorance of the registry was 
not an excuse); Brief of Legal Services Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 
11–13, 52, Lehr 463 U.S. 248 (No. 81-1756) (noting that the existence of the registry was not 
publicized anywhere, Lehr and the vast majority of unmarried fathers did not know of it, and that 
even some Family Court clerks did not know that fathers could register with it before paternity had 
been adjudicated). 
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percentage of all adoptions.339 They usually involve a man adopting the 
children of his new wife, and are the reason that men are twice as likely to 
adopt as women.340 Limitations on the rights of unmarried fathers to object 
to such adoptions were designed, in part: to encourage other men to take 
advantage of the “noble” laws that permitted them to rescue children from 
the “social stigma and consequences of bastardy;”341 to permit them to 
secure “a normal home for a child;”342 and to legitimate children who were 
deemed “at risk economically, medically, emotionally, and 
educationally.”343 
In 1989, the Court even more firmly established the rights of husbands 
over biological unmarried fathers in Michael H. v. Gerald D.344 In that 
case, Victoria was born of an affair between Michael and Carole while 
Carole was married to Gerald.345 Soon after, Carole and Victoria moved in 
with Michael, although they moved between living with Michael, Gerald, 
and another man, Scott, over the next few years.346 A blood test showed 
with 98.07% certainty that Michael was Victoria’s father.347 Michael 
supported Carole and Victoria when he was permitted to, and Victoria 
knew Michael as “Daddy.”348 Later, however, Carole reunited with 
Gerald.349 When Michael filed to establish paternity and visitation rights, 
Gerald intervened, declaring that under California law a husband was the 
presumptive father of children born to his wife, and Michael had no 
standing to challenge that presumption.350 
Although Victoria’s Guardian ad Litem argued that granting Michael 
visitation would be in the child’s best interests, a plurality of the Supreme 
Court held that neither Michael nor Victoria had any due process rights 
                                                                                                                     
 339. Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Inst., Safeguarding the Rights and Well-Being of 
Birthparents in the Adoption Process 16 (2007), available at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/old/
publications/2006_11_Birthparent_Study_All.pdf (noting that stepparent adoptions constituted 
42% of adoptions in 1992, but have stopped being tracked by courts, and have likely reduced 
somewhat since then). 
 340. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
NO. 23-27, ADOPTION EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND MEN AND DEMAND FOR CHILDREN TO ADOPT BY 
WOMEN 18–44 YEARS OF AGE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2002, at 1, 16 (2008), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_027.pdf. 
 341. Brief for Appellees Robertson at 16, Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (No. 81-1756), 1982 LEXIS 
215, at *16. 
 342. In re Malpica-Orsini, 331 N.E.2d 486, 491 (N.Y. 1975). 
 343. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266 n.25 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 344. 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989). 
 345. Id. at 113–14. 
 346.  Id. at 114. 
 347.  Id. 
 348. Id. at 143–44 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 349. Id. at 115 (majority opinion). 
 350. Id. 
48
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/6
2015] IN THE NAME OF THE CHILD 343 
 
requiring a hearing on paternity or visitation.351 Emphasizing the “historic 
respect—indeed, sanctity” that the law accorded the “unitary family,” a 
family “typified, of course, by the marital family,”352 the Court found that 
Michael’s relationship to his biological child was not “so deeply embedded 
within our traditions as to be a fundamental right.”353 When confronted 
with marriage, the biology-plus approach of the earlier cases lost hands 
down.354 Although biology alone still gave unmarried mothers rights with 
respect to their children, the choice of marital “parenthood” over biology 
would have deep implications for birth mothers in adoption policy.  
B.  Links Between Denigration of Unmarried Fathers and 
Condemnation of Poor Single Mothers 
The resurgence of legal differences stemming from unmarried 
parenthood was part of a much broader trend, one in which opposition to 
illegitimacy was repackaged from a moral issue to a socio-economic 
one.355 Daniel Moynihan, Assistant Secretary of Labor under Presidents 
John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, had already made condemning 
illegitimacy safe for liberals with the 1965 Report, The Negro Family: The 
Case for National Action, which called the “matriarchy” of unmarried 
black women a key part of the “tangle of pathology” that left black 
communities poor and crime-ridden.356 In the 1980s, President Ronald 
Reagan made the imagined “welfare queen”—black, unmarried, and using 
her children to live in luxury on welfare payments—the central figure in 
his campaign against welfare.357 In the late 1980s, media frenzies 
demonized poor single mothers of color over “crack babies”—
presumptively black, possibly Latino—and children with Fetal Alcohol 
Syndrome (FAS)—presumptively Native American.358 Although meta-
analysis of scientific studies later showed that crack use did not have 
consistent effects on cognitive or psychomotor development359 and that 
FAS was rare among even babies of alcoholic women who drank 
                                                                                                                     
 351. Id. at 119–31. 
 352. Id. at 123 & n.3. 
 353. Id. at 125. 
 354. See id. at 123. 
 355. See BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 95. 
 356. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/moynchapter4.htm (“[T]he Negro 
community has been forced into a matriarchal structure which, because it is to out of line with the 
rest of the American society, seriously retards the progress of the group as a whole . . . .”). 
 357. KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 35 (2011); see also Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law 
Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 367–68 (2011). 
 358. BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 99–108. 
 359. Id. at 100–01. 
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excessively throughout their pregnancies,360 hundreds of women were 
criminally prosecuted “and tens of thousands lost their children to foster 
care.”361  
In 1993, political scientist Charles Murray’s influential Wall Street 
Journal op-ed, The Coming White Underclass, raised the alarm that 
unmarried white women were now having children at rates similar to those 
of blacks in the 1960s and that society was doomed if this trend 
continued.362 He claimed that fatherlessness produced young men who 
were unteachable, unemployable, and ultimately criminal, and that a 
society with a substantial proportion of such men “must be ‘Lord of the 
Flies’ writ large.”363 The reason for the trend: with the advent of welfare, a 
single woman could actually afford to keep her child.364 The response: 
“end all economic support for single mothers.”365 This, Murray argued, 
would renew a healthy degree of stigma for the (newly impoverished) 
mothers unable to enlist male support for their families and discourage 
others from following in their path.366 What about the children now 
deprived of financial support? First, “[t]here are laws already on the books 
about the right of the state to take a child from a neglectful parent.”367 
Second, adoption should be “easy for any married couple who can show 
reasonable evidence of having the resources and stability to raise a 
child.”368 
These successive campaigns shifted the blame for suffering children 
from poverty and socioeconomic disadvantage to poor single mothers. By 
the mid-1990s, these trends bore significant policy fruit as well.369 In line 
with Murray’s urging, the effect of these policies was twofold—to take 
away financial support from single mothers and then to offer adoption as 
the solution for the children impoverished as a result.370 In 1996, the 
                                                                                                                     
 360. Id. at 108. 
 361. Id. at 102, 107. 
 362. Charles Murray, The Coming White Underclass, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 1993), 
http://www.sullivan-county.com/racism/murrey.htm. Murray and other conservative academics had 
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357, at 38–39. 
 363. Murray, supra note 362. 
 364. Id. 
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 369. See BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 115–17 (discussing Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich’s 
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Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) sought to “end welfare as we know it.”371 PRWORA created 
lifetime caps of five years (or less at a state’s option) on receipt of welfare, 
required women to work rather than take care of their children, authorized 
states to cap welfare payments at a certain number of children, and 
provided states with financial incentives to remove families from welfare 
rolls.372 In 1996, the Interethnic Provisions of the Multiethnic Placement 
Act (MEPA) prohibited consideration of race in placements of children for 
foster care and adoption.373 Finally in 1997, the Adoption and Safe 
Families Act (ASFA) sought to vastly increase adoption by: (1) terminating 
federal funding for family reunification and requiring states to plan for 
adoption if a child had not exited the child welfare system in fifteen 
months; (2) providing substantial tax credits to adopting parents; and (3) 
providing states with significant financial subsidies for each child adopted 
from the system.374 In other words, biological families were stripped of 
financial support, adoptive families were financially rewarded, and states 
were incentivized to end welfare payments and move children into 
adoptive homes. 
In the campaign to increase adoptions, birth mothers are either invisible 
or condemned.375 Harvard Law Professor Elizabeth Bartholet, an active 
participant in the ASFA and MEPA debates, called her 1999 paean to 
adoption Nobody’s Children,376 erasing the parents of the child, and 
echoing the old description of illegitimate children as filius nullius— 
children of no one.377 Since then, members of the Christian Right adoption 
movement have explicitly adopted the filius nullius concept, asserting that 
because the term “orphan” means fatherless child in the bible, children of 
single mothers are by definition orphans, and therefore eligible for 
adoption.378 The thousands of Christian Right “crisis pregnancy counseling 
                                                                                                                     
 371. See Jason DeParle, Welfare Limits Left Poor Adrift as Recession Hit, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 
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centers,” moreover, counsel single pregnant women that keeping an 
illegitimate child is immature and emotional and leads to harm and neglect, 
while choosing adoption is “a higher and less selfish form of love,” and a 
way to “[defeat] . . . ‘evil’ within themselves.”379 Many private adoption 
facilitators are also affiliated with the Christian Right, including both the 
Nightlight Christian Agency that helped arrange Veronica’s adoption and 
Raymond Godwin, the attorney who represented the Capobiancos in the 
South Carolina courts and co-founded Carolina Christian Hope Adoption 
Agency with his wife, Laura.380 (The name Nightlight may be familiar. 
Nightlight was at the center of media attention when President George W. 
Bush praised it as the pioneer of Snowflakes® Embryo Adoptions, 
“adoptions” of embryos discarded during in vitro fertilization.)381  
Unmarried fathers lost further rights in this period as well. Following 
two high profile challenges to adoptions by unmarried fathers in the 
1990s,382 thirty-four states have now adopted putative father registries like 
that upheld in Lehr, many providing unmarried fathers only thirty days 
after a child’s birth to register.383 South Carolina does not have a putative 
father registry, but its statutes require unmarried fathers to show they either 
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 383. Id. at 170–71, 180. 
52
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/6
2015] IN THE NAME OF THE CHILD 347 
 
lived with or supported their child or the child’s mother in order to have 
standing to object to adoption of their infant children.384  
This shift is even clearer in the uniform laws on the subject. In 1988, 
the drafters of the Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act declined to 
recommend a putative father registry, opining that “most fathers or 
potential fathers—even very responsible ones—are not likely to know 
about the registry.”385 Further, the Uniform Adoption Act of 1994, (which 
has only been adopted in Vermont) required notice to all putative fathers, 
but limited the fathers whose consent was necessary for adoption.386 In 
contrast, the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000 (adopted in part by eight 
states) required an unmarried father to either register as a putative father or 
file a suit to establish paternity to avoid losing any right to notice of 
adoption of a child less than one year old.387 While states have not widely 
adopted any of these uniform laws, this progression reveals the shift from a 
modicum of protection of parental rights to an emphasis on quick and easy 
adoption of desirable newborns. Only a minority of states have statutes that 
permit unmarried fathers to assert rights if they can show they were 
thwarted in their desire to parent or support a child.388 Notably, Oklahoma 
is among those states.389 
Although South Carolina’s statute does not create an exception for 
thwarted fathers, the South Carolina Supreme Court found in Abernathy v. 
Baby Boy390 that the constitution compelled such an exception to protect 
the rights of fathers who had been denied the opportunity to parent.391 The 
facts of Abernathy are eerily similar to those in Adoptive Couple, including 
the fact that the birth father was on active duty in the military, implored the 
birth mother to marry him when he learned she was pregnant, and the birth 
mother rejected his offer and later refused further contact from him.392 In 
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fact, in her September 29, 2011 order from the bench, family court Judge 
Deborah Malphrus originally found that Brown was a thwarted father 
under Abernathy and its progeny.393  
Oddly, although no further evidence or pleadings were presented, Judge 
Malphrus reversed this finding in her formal November 25, 2011 order, 
and the South Carolina Supreme Court did not revisit the issue, resting its 
opinion on ICWA alone.394 It seems even odder that in response to this 
same set of facts, the Supreme Court majority declared not just once, but 
seven times in its opinion, that Brown had “abandoned” his child.395 Given 
the decades of law and policy treating noncustodial fathers as mere spoilers 
keeping children from the blessings of legitimacy, however, that 
conclusion was likely only too easy to reach. 
The shift toward easy adoption and away from rights of biological 
parents has not helped children, and in many cases has hurt them. Given 
the demand for infants relinquished for adoption at birth and the reality that 
many unmarried noncustodial fathers are not interested in parenting their 
children, these legal changes are unlikely to have much effect on demand 
or stability of adoption of newborns. And although the number of 
adoptions from foster care has increased since 1996 to around 50,000 per 
year, the percentage of children leaving foster care through adoption has 
remained at about 20% since 2002.396 Rates of adoption from foster care, 
moreover, began to increase rapidly before the enactment of ASFA,397 and 
much of the recent increase is due to increases in adoptions by relatives.398 
Because more than half of children still exit foster care by parental 
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reunification,399 shifting federal funds from family preservation to adoption 
lessens the chance that these children receive effective parenting.400 Nor 
did the legal changes reduce the number of children in foster care. In 2006, 
the number of children in foster care was 505,000, compared to 507,000 in 
1996 when ASFA was adopted.401 Since 2006, the number has dropped to 
approximately 400,000, but this reduction is wholly accounted for by the 
smaller number of children entering the system.402  
Meanwhile, cuts to welfare for needy families have affected millions of 
poor children. If successful in helping poor mothers achieve economic 
well-being, PRWORA would have truly benefitted both women and 
children. Not surprisingly given its origins in hysteria regarding 
illegitimacy and welfare cheats, PRWORA was not well designed to do so. 
Although work requirements were mandatory, states were not required to 
provide childcare for working mothers or count education (which might 
qualify women for well-paying jobs) as work.403 Once jobs dried up during 
the recession, lifetime limits left families in abject poverty.404 
In essence, in the name of reducing illegitimacy and helping children in 
foster care, the United States has enacted a system that limits the rights of 
all birth parents in adoptions, reduces parenting support for the birth 
families to which most foster children will return, and undermines stable 
incomes and child care for many more poor families. These measures have 
slightly increased the small percentage of children who exit foster care 
through adoption but have had no effect on the vast majority of children in 
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& FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES 1998: ANNUAL 
REPORT 4-3 (2000), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cwo98/cwo98.pdf.  
 400. See ROBERTS, supra note 298, at 103 (opining that emphasis on “freeing” foster children 
for adoption may exacerbate racism in the child welfare system). 
 401. Trends in Foster Care and Adoption, supra note 396, at 1; STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS 
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HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2006 ESTIMATES AS OF 
JANUARY 2008, at 1 (2008), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport14.pdf 
(offering a slightly different preliminary estimate for number of children in foster care as of 
September 30, 2006). 
 402. See Trends in Foster Care and Adoption, supra note 396, at 1 (displaying a table showing 
that since FY2006, an average of 34,500 fewer children per year (or a total of 242,000 fewer 
children) have entered foster care). Increasing ratios of exit from foster care to entry have little 
impact. Between 2006 and 2012, only about 1,571 more children exit than enter per year (a 0.6% 
difference). See id. For the entire decade between 2002 and 2012, moreover, an average of 5,270 
more children entered than exited foster care each year (a 1.85% difference). See id. 
 403. See GUSTAFSON, supra note 357, at 45–46. 
 404. DeParle, supra note 371. 
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the system. Adoptive Couple was decided against the backdrop of the false 
narrative that adoption is the cure for illegitimacy and poverty, unmarried 
parents who object to adoption are irresponsible and uncaring, and that 
parental rights and procedural safeguards will block the hungry tide of 
prospective adoptive parents. No part of this narrative supports the rights 
or interests of women or their children.  
V.  ECONOMICS 
Of course, the narrative of children’s interests has gained currency 
against a backdrop of powerful economic interests. States are ostensibly 
interested in encouraging adoption of low-income children by higher-
income families to reduce state welfare rolls. Further, private adoption 
agencies and attorneys who facilitate most adoptions in the United States 
are interested in maintaining a steady supply of completed adoptions on 
behalf of the parents who pay them. Finally, the trends toward expensive 
private adoptions and later childbearing for upper-middle-class women 
have ensured a growing economic divide between adoptive and birth 
parents.  
A.  State Interests 
Charles Murray’s linking of adoption and the end of welfare was 
nothing new. Adoption has long been proposed as a magic bullet to solve 
the problems of poverty, and policies to increase the number of adoptions 
often go hand in hand with efforts to reduce welfare rolls.405 Because most 
needs-based welfare assistance is tied to the support for minor children,406 
removing the children often means removing financial support. These 
policies were not directly at issue in Adoptive Couple—while the state paid 
for her medical services, Maldonado was employed as a casino worker by 
the Osage Tribe,407 and Brown was first a soldier and then working in 
private security while serving in the National Guard408—but they helped to 
shaped the legal and policy background of the case.  
As Professor Laura Briggs has documented, American Indian children, 
like African American children, became targets for child welfare removals 
after they began receiving state-financed welfare assistance in large 
numbers.409 Native children had always been vulnerable to removal from 
                                                                                                                     
 405. See, e.g., JOYCE, supra note 182, at 45 (describing “orphan trains” of the 1880s to the 
1920s shipping urban immigrant children from American cities to be adopted by Protestant farmers 
to relieve pressure on public support). 
 406. Brynne Keith-Jennings, SNAP Plays a Critical Role in Helping Children, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (July 17, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3805. 
 407. See Brewer, Some Disturbing Facts, supra note 39. 
 408. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 553 n.2 (S.C. 2012) 
 409. BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 7–8. 
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their families, from the earliest colonial efforts to obtain children as 
hostages and subjects of acculturation to the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century federal and religious efforts to place children in boarding schools 
where they could be separated from uncivilized tribal influences.410 But 
these efforts were not focused on adoption—instead, Indian children would 
be taught to be non-Indians and then released to support themselves and 
provide an example to their families. Economic assistance did not come 
from states or municipalities, but was provided by the federal Indian 
Department (later the BIA) in the form of rations doled out by reservation 
agents pursuant to treaty agreements.411 There were links between 
economic assistance and child removal—parents could have their rations 
docked if they did not send their children to school412—but they were 
largely indirect.  
The Social Security Act of 1935413 required states to provide Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children to all eligible families in the state, 
imposing some uniformity on the disparate, poor relief programs provided 
by states, municipalities, and private charities.414 Although states and 
counties vigorously resisted provision of welfare to families on 
reservations,415 by the 1950s, Indian children and families started receiving 
state welfare assistance, and, with it, contact with state social workers.416 
This began a tide of children flowing from reservations into the child 
welfare system and from there into white adoptive homes.417 The BIA 
encouraged this tide with its Indian Adoption Project, which placed a 
federal stamp of approval on child removal as a response to poverty of 
Indian children.418 In the 1960s, in response to pleas by mothers and 
grandmothers, the Association of American Indian Affairs began holding 
press conferences and litigating cases across the country regarding the 
casual removal of Indian children from their families.419 In 1974, Congress 
began holding hearings on the issue; finally, after four years of hearings 
                                                                                                                     
 410. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.04 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 
2012). 
 411. Id. § 22.06[1]. 
 412. Id.; 25 U.S.C. § 283 (2012). 
 413. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 414. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10)(A) (1994) (repealed 1996). 
 415. See, e.g., Acosta v. San Diego Cnty., 272 P.2d 92, 93–94 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954); State 
ex rel. Williams v. Kamp, 78 P.2d 585, 587 (Mont. 1938); State Bd. of Pub. Welfare v. Bd. of 
Comm’rs, 137 S.E.2d 801, 801–03 (N.C. 1964). 
 416. BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 71. 
 417. Id. 
 418. PRUCHA, supra note 259, at 1154. 
 419. BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 77–82. 
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without action, the Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted in 1978.420  
A similar history unfolded with respect to African Americans, who 
began to swell child welfare rolls in the 1960s just as civil rights advocacy 
and legal changes made them eligible for such benefits in large numbers 
for the first time.421 Although white families have always comprised the 
majority of those receiving welfare in the United States, by the 1980s, the 
black, unmarried, “welfare queen” had become the powerful image of 
welfare in the United States.422 Removing children from these women 
would end both their entitlement to economic support and the threat of 
social contagion from these demonized mothers to their children.423  
But removing children from their families does not actually make 
economic sense. First, it is expensive to keep children in foster care, and 
relatively few foster children exit through adoption by middle-income 
families.424 But ASFA created federal subsidies for adoptions from foster 
care that can incentivize states to remove the children and seek adoption 
anyway.425 These subsidies are higher—as much as three times higher—for 
“special needs” children; South Dakota, the target of a recent investigation 
for its removals of Indian children and noncompliance with ICWA, has 
designated all Indian children as special needs children.426 (As an aside, 
Veronica was labeled a special needs child because of her mixed race 
heritage, resulting in a larger adoption tax credit to the Capobiancos.)427 At 
least officially, moreover, states did not support the adoptive couple’s 
position in this case. As discussed above, eighteen states—not including 
South Dakota or Oklahoma, but including many other states with high 
Indian populations—filed an amicus brief in support of the birth father and 
the procedures required by ICWA.428 The perceived links between 
adoption, child welfare, and state financial assistance, however, likely 
helped shape the legal and policy assumptions Brown faced in the Supreme 
Court.  
                                                                                                                     
 420. Id. at 90–91. 
 421. Id. at 38–41. 
 422. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.  
 423. See supra Section IV.B. 
 424. See supra Part II. 
 425. See ROBERTS, supra note 298, at 110. 
 426. Laura Sullivan & Amy Walters, Incentives and Cultural Bias Fuel Foster System, NPR 
(Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/10/25/141662357/incentives-and-cultural-bias-fuel-
foster-system. 
 427. Email from Chrissi Nimmo, Assistant Attorney Gen., Cherokee Nation, to Bethany R. 
Berger, Professor, Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law (Mar. 18, 2014) (on file with author). See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 23(a)(3) (2012) (allowing adoption credit of $10,000 over actual adoption expenses for special 
needs children). 
 428. Brief of the States, supra note 25, at at 3–4. 
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B.  Adoption Industry Interests 
More powerful than state interests were those of the adoption industry, 
whose business model depends on infant adoptions. Private entities have 
long sought to profit from families wishing to adopt. Indeed, governments 
and nonprofits only began coordinating adoptions in the 1900s after 
unlicensed “baby brokers” started trying to fulfill the demand.429 Even after 
official organizations got into the business, scandals over “baby snatching” 
and “baby buying” gained congressional attention in the 1920s and 
1950s.430 Both adoption facilitators and adoptive parents, however, fended 
off proposals to create federal regulation of the industry, leaving private 
adoptions to lighter state regulation.431 
Although private adoptions have long generated concern, one difference 
has an enormous impact on the economic interests in adoptions. 
Historically, adoptions accompanied by the exchange of money were 
considered illegal or “black market” adoptions.432 Although adopting 
parents were encouraged to make donations to adoption agencies, 
adoptions were not themselves a source of profit.433 Even when agencies 
began to charge fees, as late as the 1970s these fees were often on a sliding 
scale based on the income of the adopters.434 
Today, of course, things are different, with costs amounting to tens of 
thousands of dollars, and sometimes much more, for adopting an infant.435 
In the words of political economist and Barnard College President Debora 
Spar, “despite the heartfelt sentiments of parents and providers, there is a 
flourishing market for both children and their component parts. . . . and 
many individuals are profiting handsomely.”436 Although many agree that 
adoption is now a market,437 “the baby market does not operate like other 
                                                                                                                     
 429. DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE 
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 166–67 (2006). 
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 434. Elizabeth Landes & Richard Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL 
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markets do. There are differential prices that make little sense; scale 
economies that don’t bring lower costs; and customers who will literally 
pay whatever they possibly can.”438  
Melanie Duncan’s testimony gives some insight into the multiplicity of 
private entities involved in a typical adoption. The Capobiancos decided to 
work with a private attorney rather than an agency, but wound up working 
with multiple agencies, with attorney Raymond Godwin essentially acting 
as a contractor managing many interests.439 First, there was Adoption 
Advertising, Inc., to which they paid $8,700 to connect them to 
Maldonado.440 There was also over $2,000 to Adoption Advocacy, Inc. for 
pre- and post-placement home studies.441 Then there was Phyllis 
Zimmerman, the attorney they hired to represent Maldonado in the case.442 
Godwin also contracted on their behalf to have Nightlight Christian 
Adoption Agency, whose South Carolina office is run by his wife, conduct 
the birth family study.443 Through Godwin, the Capobiancos also paid for a 
number of Maldonado’s “expenses” including her rent, utility, and car 
payments.444 In her testimony, Melanie Duncan initially guessed that they 
had spent $20,000 to $40,000 for the adoption before the litigation arose, 
but later, when asked if this was all, said, “I don’t even want to speculate. 
It’s going to be more than that . . . I know that’s a low figure.”445  
Not surprisingly, the number and kind of entities offering private 
adoption services have multiplied since the advent of fees for adoptions.446 
One study by the National Adoption Information Clearinghouse found that 
the number increased by several hundred just between 1995 and 1998, 
reaching a total of 1764.447 Today, the internet exponentially increases the 
number and diversity of entities facilitating adoption.448 There are, 
however, no uniform national statistics regarding adoption service 
providers, or even consistent tracking of the total number and kind of 
                                                                                                                     
that its primary purpose is to find families for children”); Sanford Katz, Dual Systems of Adoption 
in the United States, in CROSS CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
ENGLAND 284 (Sanford Katz et al. eds., 2000); QUIROZ, supra note 187, at 6 (describing adoption as 
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 438. SPAR, supra note 429, at xvi. 
 439. Testimony of Adoptive Mother, supra note 53, at 171:19–24. 
 440. Id. at 191:13-21, 
 441. Id. at 190:16–24. 
 442. Id. at 173:19–25. 
 443. Id. at 178:3–5. 
 444. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, No. 2009-DR-10-03803, at 14 (S.C. Fam. Ct. Sept. 29, 
2011). 
 445. Testimony of Adoptive Mother, supra note 53, at 189:13-16, 198:22–199:4. 
 446. See FREUNDLICH, supra note 177, at 3. 
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 448. See HOWARD, supra note 437, at 4–5. 
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private adoptions.449 
Although the different entities providing adoption services are in 
professional competition,450 their business model depends on two things: 
adoptable infants and completed adoptions. The ability to link adoption to 
the personal and romanticized realm of family formation has shielded the 
market aspects of adoption providing a powerful narrative for those 
seeking a regulatory environment that protects their interests.451 The 
National Council for Adoption (NCFA), for example, was formed in the 
1980s when private adoption agencies banded together to prevent federal 
promulgation of a Model State Adoption Act, which would have provided 
for open adoptions and mandated that a mother could not finally agree to 
relinquishment until two weeks after birth.452 After defeating the proposal, 
the NCFA contributed substantially to the Uniform Adoption Act of 
1994,453 which provides for permanently sealed adoption records, 
relinquishment for adoption immediately after birth, and limited rights of 
unmarried fathers.454 The NCFA has also been charged with successfully 
opposing federal regulation that would set limits on adoption fees.455  
The result of this successful advocacy is that, although all states 
regulate private adoptions to some degree, many claim the industry is 
largely unregulated.456 These regulations also vary widely from state to 
state, with some states known for loose adoption regulations.457 South 
Carolina, for example, was known as a haven for lax adoption practices in 
the 1980s; although the laws have changed since then, some claim the 
reputation remains valid.458 A telling example of the light regulation 
possible is the comment by Russell Moore, a prominent proponent of the 
Christian adoption movement, that the local humane society had refused to 
allow his family to have a cat, noting that they had been “qualified by the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky to be fit to adopt two children but not one 
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 450. See Katz, supra note 437, at 283–85. 
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cat.”459 Ironically, Moore intended this as a condemnation of the humane 
society,460 rather than the system in place to ensure adequate families for 
children. 
ICWA may serve children, tribal, and parental interests, but it is 
contrary to the interests of private providers. ICWA’s placement 
preferences will likely result in a child becoming entirely unavailable for a 
high-priced adoption, and being placed instead with a family unlikely to 
afford the agency fees.461 In an outrageous recent case, a private adoption 
agency even claimed “good cause” for deviation from the placement 
preferences after demanding that, to be eligible, any families from the 
child’s tribe had to be able to pay the agency’s $27,500 fee.462 In addition, 
by providing birth parents with additional protections in voluntary 
adoptions, and increasing the rights of birth fathers to consent at all, ICWA 
may result in refusals to consent to adoption or revocations of initial 
consent. In general, ICWA reflects a different era of adoption law, one in 
which the United States was coming to terms with the harms of closed, 
coerced adoptions of nonmarital children, and before the focus of adoption 
practice shifted from finding homes for needy children to finding children 
for infertile couples.463 It is not surprising that both the NCFA and the 
American Academy of Adoption Attorneys filed amicus briefs on behalf of 
the Capobiancos,464 and celebrated the result.465 
C.  Class and Paths to Parenthood 
The most obvious economic factor in Adoptive Couple was the way 
class divided the birth parents and the prospective adoptive parents, 
replicating the divides between relinquishing and adoptive parents in 
private adoptions generally. These divides mean both that the upper-
middle-class people who make and implement rules regarding adoption—
lawyers, judges, and legislators—will find it easier to empathize with 
adoptive parents, and that many people of all classes will see adopters as 
better parents. They help to explain why Dusten Brown—a decorated war 
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veteran, supposedly one of America’s heroes—was so roundly condemned 
by observers, including the Supreme Court itself, and why it was so easy to 
sell a misleading narrative about the facts of the case. 
Infertility was once primarily a matter of biology, affecting the well-off 
and the poor alike, if not disproportionately the poor because of the health 
effects of disadvantage. Dramatic advances in reproductive technology 
have reduced the incidence of infertility, again with particular benefit to 
those with the ability to pay. As opportunities began to open for working 
women, however, neither the economies of the workplace nor those of the 
home shifted to accommodate care for children.466 In response, women 
with significant educational and career opportunities began to delay 
childbearing to balance the demands on their time.467 The result was a 
growth in structural rather than biological infertility, disproportionately 
affecting upper-middle-class women.468 The demand for adoption, once 
distributed relatively equally across the working and middle class, now 
took a decisive class shift. At the same time, the shift to expensive private 
agency adoptions meant that infant adoption was placed out of reach for 
most working-class families.469  
The three youngest Supreme Court Justices illustrate this trend. The 
two women, Justice Elena Kagan and Justice Sotomayor are both 
unmarried and without children. The man—Chief Justice Roberts—
married another high-powered lawyer when they were both in their forties 
and adopted two children.470 In fact, Chief Justice Roberts has experienced 
the controversy arising from stringent adoption requirements first hand, as 
right-wing conspiracy fanatics seized on the fact that his children are from 
Ireland (a country that does not permit nonresidents to adopt),471 to allege 
that President Obama used the supposed illegality of the adoptions to 
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blackmail Roberts into voting to uphold the Affordable Care Act.472   
Adoption has become not just a matter of class, but also a matter of 
gender equality, and even reproductive rights.473 Adoption has permitted 
women to devote themselves to their education and careers and yet also be 
mothers. Indeed, even as low-income single mothers became demonized in 
the media, another group, so-called “single mothers by choice,” largely 
well-educated, professional women who choose to have children on their 
own, has grown and gained significant acceptance and influence since 
former Vice-President Dan Quayle’s attack on Murphy Brown.474 A telling 
example of this is Elizabeth Bartholet, a Harvard Law professor who wrote 
about employment discrimination before becoming a transracial adoption 
advocate after she adopted two Peruvian boys as a single mother in the 
1980s.475 Adoption gained more traction as a civil and reproductive rights 
question as the LGBT movement raised claims regarding the rights of 
same-sex families to adopt and parent.476 Of course the foil for all of these 
claims was that children would benefit by moving into middle-class 
families, even if those families were nonbiological, older, female-headed, 
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International Adoption: Saving Orphans or Child Trafficking?, CNN WORLD (Sept. 18, 2013, 2:41 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/world/international-adoption-saving-orphans-child-traffick 
ing/ (stating that Elizabeth Bartholet adopted children from Peru in the 1980s). 
 476. See, e.g., Howard v. Child Welfare Agency Review Bd., No. CV 1999-9881, 2004 WL 
3154530, at *1, *13 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2004) (invalidating Arkansas’ exclusion of gay people 
as foster parents), aff’d sub nom. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Howard, 238 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2006); Fla. 
Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) 
(invalidating Florida’s statute prohibiting adoption of children by homosexual foster parents); 
BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 97. 
64
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/6
2015] IN THE NAME OF THE CHILD 359 
 
or LGBT.477 While this narrative is usually true—willing, caring parents 
are always better than unwilling, incapable, or abusive ones—this does not 
undermine its class dimensions or justify diminishing the rights of birth 
families who may be less wealthy but are fully able to love and care for 
their children.  
This class narrative affected the Adoptive Couple case from the 
beginning.478 Christinna Maldonado selected the Capobiancos because 
“they’re a mother and father that live inside a home where she can look up 
to them and they can give her everything she needs when needed.”479 Jo 
Prowell, the Guardian ad Litem who followed the case to the Supreme 
Court, resisted repeated requests by the Browns and their attorney to 
conduct a home study of the Browns. They testified that, when she did 
conduct the study, she told them about how well educated the Capobiancos 
were, what a beautiful home they had, and how they could send Veronica 
to any private school and college they chose.480 She allegedly said that they 
needed to “get down on [their] knees and pray to . . . make the right 
decision for this baby.”481 The South Carolina Supreme Court, although it 
ruled against the Capobiancos, called them “ideal parents.”482 Dusten 
Brown, despite his loving and supportive parents, close relationship with 
his other daughter, and decorated military service, could only be less than 
                                                                                                                     
 477. The median income of adoptive parents has been consistently higher than the median 
income of biological parents ever since the government began tracking such data in 2000. See ROSE 
M. KREIDER & DAPHNE A. LOFQUIST, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND STEPCHILDREN: 
2010, at 17 (2014), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p20-572.pdf (listing the 
median household income for adopted children under eighteen at $73,000 and the same figure for 
biological children at $60,000); ROSE M. KREIDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND 
STEPCHILDREN: 2000, at 17 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-6.pdf 
(listing the median household income for adopted children under 18 at $56,000 and the same figure 
for biological children at $48,000). 
 478. A recent Harvard Law Review commentary thus misses the point in arguing that the point 
of contention in the case is between biological and affective definitions of family. See Indian Child 
Welfare Act—Termination of Parental Rights—Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
368 (2013). Although the piece is correct that changing definitions of the family and the demotion 
of biology in many people’s lives is important, see id. at 377, it misses the profound implications of 
the line the Court chose to draw here for historically disadvantaged families, biological or not, and 
the prioritization of marital families over even affective families in cases like Michael H. v. Gerald 
D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), and Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53,73 (2001) (holding that a son born out 
of wedlock in Vietnam but who had resided in the U.S. with his citizen father for years could not 
claim citizenship through his father, although one could claim citizenship through a citizen mother 
in similar circumstances). See supra notes 344–50 and accompanying text. The class and 
disadvantage-based implications of this line explain why the majority was dominated by the 
conservative members of the Court, while the minority by the progressive members. 
 479. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 553 (S.C. 2012). 
 480. See Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 513, 568.  
 481. See id. at 513, 570. 
 482. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 567. 
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“ideal.” In the media circus the Capobiancos’ public relations team created, 
he became just another deadbeat dad who was careless with his sperm and 
bad for his daughter, while the Capobiancos were the parents to which any 
right-thinking father would give his child.  
CONCLUSION 
On October 10, 2013, two weeks after relinquishing Veronica to the 
Capobiancos, Brown decided to end all appeals in the case.483 Holding 
back tears, he said, “I cannot bear to continue it any longer . . . I love her 
too much to continue to have her in the spotlight.”484 Baby Girl is now, and 
will likely remain, Veronica Capobianco.  
Although there was no hearing about what would be in Veronica’s best 
interests, one can hope that she will come out of this well. In general, 
adoptees, including transracial adoptees, have similar outcomes to 
nonadoptees,485 and there is nothing to suggest that the Capobiancos will 
not provide her with a stable, loving family. While transracial adoptees 
grapple with distinctive ethnic identity issues, with supportive families 
they otherwise thrive.486 Indian adoptees, in particular, struggle with 
identity issues and sometimes suffer serious harms as a result, but they 
usually do well so long as their adoptive families are open and supportive 
of their Indian identities and relationship to their Indian families.487 The 
brutal legal and media battle that pitted the Capobiancos against the 
Browns and the Cherokee Nation, of course, makes it harder to imagine 
                                                                                                                     
 483. Overall, supra note 101. 
 484. Id. 
 485. See HOLLEE MCGINNIS ET AL., EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INSTITUTE, BEYOND 
CULTURE CAMP: PROMOTING HEALTH IDENTITY FORMATION IN ADOPTION 9 (Adam Pertman ed., 
2009), available at http://adoptioninstitute.org/old/publications/2009_11_BeyondCultureCamp.pdf. 
 486. See id. at 5–7, 17–19 (reporting results of a study comparing Korean and White adoptees, 
and summarizing studies regarding adoption generally). 
 487. See RITA J. SIMON & SARAH HERNANDEZ, NATIVE AMERICAN TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES 
TELL THEIR STORIES (2008) (collecting interviews in which many, despite reports of happy 
childhoods and enhanced opportunities through adoption, speak of struggles with Indian identity 
and the sense that Indian children should ideally be placed with Indian families); Rita Sindelar, 
Negotiating Indian Identity: Native Americans and Transracial Adoption, at 50–51 (Aug. 2004) 
(unpublished Master’s Dissertation, Loyola University Chicago) (on file with Lewis Library, Loyola 
University Chicago). The UN Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has also raised 
concerns about the denial of Veronica’s right to cultural identity, USA/Indigenous Peoples: UN 
Expert Urges Respect for the Rights of Cherokee Child in Custody Dispute, UNITED NATIONS OFF. 
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS. (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID= 13695&LangIE; see also Kristen A. Carpenter & Lorie 
Graham, Human Rights to Culture, Family, & Self-Determination: The Case of Adoptive Couple v. 
Baby Girl, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Stefan Kirchner & Joan Policastri eds. 
forthcoming 2015), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2401886 (discussing human rights 
concerns). 
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that relationship developing. In particular, the Capobiancos’ decision to 
serve Brown and the Cherokee Nation with a demand for half a million 
dollars for attorney’s fees and costs two days after Brown relinquished 
Veronica488 (and file a new demand for over one million dollars a month 
later)489 seems gratuitously vindictive, particularly because the attorneys 
worked pro bono. 
For the Browns, of course, this is a tragedy that will last a lifetime. 
Studies of single mothers coerced into relinquishing their children find 
lifelong grief similar to that caused by the death of a child.490 Like them, 
the Browns have lost a child against their will, and will likely always feel 
the effects. 
But Veronica is just one little girl, and the Browns are just one family. 
More troubling than the impact of this case on the participants is the 
potential impact on all members of the adoption triad—children, birth 
parents, and adoptive parents. The decision, particularly without Justice 
Breyer’s gloss on it,491 has the potential to wipe out ICWA rights of almost 
all Indian birth fathers and even birth mothers who do not have legal 
custody of their children. In private adoption cases, it provides a neat 
loophole to evade the requirement to seek suitable families within the 
child’s extended family or tribe. And although the Court did not adopt the 
existing Indian family exception, the decision may breathe new life into 
what had become a dying and discredited doctrine.492 
The decision also sanctions dubious tactics like those practiced here, 
evading proper notice under the law until the long illegal placement of a 
child could ripen into a legal right to remain. Because the Supreme Court 
left untouched the requirement that all parents receive notice of adoptions 
under ICWA,493 there will be other parents that learn of these unsanctioned 
placements and challenge them, just as Brown did, with the potential for 
more disruption and heartache for their children and prospective and birth 
families.  
                                                                                                                     
 488. Suzette Brewer, Capobiancos Sue Dusten Brown for Nearly Half a Million in Fees, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Sept. 25, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com
/2013/09/25/capobiancos-sue-dusten-brown-nearly-half-million-fees-151444. 
 489. Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and Brief in Support, supra note 1. 
 490. JOYCE, supra note 182, at 93. 
 491. See supra notes 143, 164 and accompanying text. 
 492. The decision has already been repeatedly cited regarding the limitations of the application 
of ICWA to noncustodial mothers and fathers. See, e.g., In re Elise W., No. A136845, 2014 WL 
98674, at *9 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2014) (using Adoptive Couple to argue for the 
limitation of applicability of ICWA to termination of a mother’s rights because the mother was non-
Indian and the Indian father never had custody of the child); In re Laird, No. 315895, 2014 WL 
308868, at *3 n.4 (Mich. App. 2014) (using Adoptive Couple as affirmation of an earlier decision 
that active efforts were not required when family was already broken up at the time of the petition). 
 493. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2012). 
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Ultimately, the decision and its aftermath place the stamp of approval 
on a long process of recasting adoption as a system to provide children to 
well-off families, while framing measures that accomplish that goal as 
furthering the children’s interests. This reframing threatens all vulnerable 
communities and families. For Native communities—small, without the 
resources to pay hefty adoption fees, and struggling with generations of 
child removals—the impact is even greater. For them, the false narratives 
surrounding this case have combined to condone and perpetuate centuries 
of real intergenerational loss. 
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